DPoW: A decentralized proof-of-work consensus mechanism for blockchain system

IF 4.6 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE
Shasha Yu, Yanan Qiao, Fan Yang, Junge Bo
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Proof of Work (PoW) serves as a consensus mechanism in blockchain that verifies and selects the next node through solving computationally intensive puzzles. As competition in computation has intensified and mining difficulty has increased, individual miners have tended to join forces by forming mining pools. This allows them to generate blocks more quickly and receive a consistent portion of the block reward, rather than randomly. However, this collaboration could potentially introduce a centralization risk, as a few pools gain significant control over the network’s hash power. To alleviate the centralization in PoW mining, this research proposes an incentive mechanism named Decentralized Proof of Work (DPoW), where a dynamic reward allocation algorithm is designed and the mining rewards are dynamically allocated between the first and second block proposer. Then a dynamic evolutionary game model based on node behavior is constructed to simulate the pool evolution process. This model considers different pool selection preference towards original PoW and the proposed DPoW. Solo miners can dynamically adjust their strategies based on the expected payoff and revenue stability. Furthermore, the equilibrium stability of the model in DPoW is compared with that in original PoW. Through theoretically probing miner preferences in pool selection and assessing decentralization metrics, this research demonstrates DPoW enables the blockchain network to enjoy decentralization superiority compared to traditional PoW.
DPoW:区块链系统的去中心化工作量证明共识机制
工作量证明(PoW)作为区块链中的共识机制,通过解决计算密集型难题来验证和选择下一个节点。随着计算竞争的加剧和挖矿难度的增加,个体矿工倾向于通过组建矿池来联合起来。这使得他们能够更快地生成区块,并获得一致的区块奖励,而不是随机的。然而,这种合作可能会带来集中化风险,因为一些矿池对网络的哈希算力有很大的控制权。为了缓解PoW挖矿中的中心化问题,本研究提出了一种名为去中心化工作量证明(Decentralized Proof of Work, DPoW)的激励机制,该机制设计了一种动态奖励分配算法,并在第一个和第二个区块提议者之间动态分配采矿奖励。然后构建了基于节点行为的动态演化博弈模型来模拟池演化过程。该模型考虑了对原始PoW和建议DPoW的不同池选择偏好。独立矿工可以根据预期收益和收入稳定性动态调整策略。并将模型在DPoW下的平衡稳定性与原PoW下的平衡稳定性进行了比较。通过从理论上探索矿工在池选择中的偏好和评估去中心化指标,本研究表明,与传统的PoW相比,DPoW使区块链网络享有去中心化优势。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Computer Networks
Computer Networks 工程技术-电信学
CiteScore
10.80
自引率
3.60%
发文量
434
审稿时长
8.6 months
期刊介绍: Computer Networks is an international, archival journal providing a publication vehicle for complete coverage of all topics of interest to those involved in the computer communications networking area. The audience includes researchers, managers and operators of networks as well as designers and implementors. The Editorial Board will consider any material for publication that is of interest to those groups.
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