Vertical cooperation strategy of ports and shipping companies considering emission reduction

Abstract

Carbon taxation policies has raised higher requirements for emissions reduction in the maritime supply chain. However, the insufficient momentum in emissions reduction caused by financial constraints and unclear reduction strategies has greatly impacted the effectiveness of emissions reduction efforts. This study considers a second-tier maritime supply chain under the carbon taxation regulation. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is constructed to analyze the investment strategies for vertical cooperative emission reduction in three scenarios. The research findings reveal that investment in information-sharing cooperative ports yields the lowest carbon emissions. Shipping companies achieves the highest profit by investing in information-sharing cooperative ports when the unit variable cost does not exceed the threshold ($c_e=0.3$). Otherwise, the highest profit is achieved by not investing. The information sharing discount level exhibits convex curve, inverse and positive relationship with the profit of information-sharing cooperative ports, non-cooperative ports, and shipping companies, respectively.