Game-Theoretic Protection Adoption Against Networked SIS Epidemics

IF 6.7 2区计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering Pub Date : 2025-03-26 DOI:10.1109/TNSE.2025.3554807

Abhisek Satapathi;Ashish R. Hota

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Abstract

In this paper, we investigate game-theoretic strategies for containing spreading processes on large-scale networks. Specifically, we consider the class of networked susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemics where a large population of agents strategically choose whether to adopt partially effective protection. We define the utilities of the agents which depend on the degree of the agent, its individual infection status and action, as well as the the overall prevalence of the epidemic and strategy profile of the entire population. We further present the coupled dynamics of epidemic evolution as well as strategy update which is assumed to follow the replicator dynamics. By relying on timescale separation arguments, we first derive the game-theoretic protection adoption strategies of the agents for a given epidemic state, and then present the reduced epidemic dynamics. The existence and uniqueness of endemic equilibrium is rigorously characterized and forms the main result of this paper. We then present extensive numerical results to highlight the impacts of heterogeneous node degrees, infection rates, cost of protection adoption, and effectiveness of protection on the epidemic prevalence at the equilibrium. Finally, we illustrate the evolution of the networked SIR epidemic under game-theoretic protection adoption.

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针对网络化SIS流行病的博弈论保护措施

本文研究了大规模网络中包含扩散过程的博弈论策略。具体来说，我们考虑了网络化易感-感染-易感（SIS）流行病的类别，其中大量代理策略性地选择是否采用部分有效的保护。我们根据药剂的程度、个体感染状态和作用以及整个人群的总体流行率和策略概况来定义药剂的效用。我们进一步提出了流行病演变的耦合动力学以及假设遵循复制因子动力学的策略更新。利用时间尺度分离论证，首先推导了给定疫情状态下agent的博弈论保护策略，然后给出了简化的疫情动态。对地方性平衡的存在唯一性进行了严格的刻画，形成了本文的主要成果。然后，我们提出了广泛的数值结果，以突出异质节点度、感染率、采用保护的成本和保护的有效性对均衡时流行病流行的影响。最后，我们说明了在博弈论保护下网络化SIR流行病的演变。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering Engineering-Control and Systems Engineering

CiteScore

12.60

自引率

9.10%

发文量

393

期刊介绍： The proposed journal, called the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering (TNSE), is committed to timely publishing of peer-reviewed technical articles that deal with the theory and applications of network science and the interconnections among the elements in a system that form a network. In particular, the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering publishes articles on understanding, prediction, and control of structures and behaviors of networks at the fundamental level. The types of networks covered include physical or engineered networks, information networks, biological networks, semantic networks, economic networks, social networks, and ecological networks. Aimed at discovering common principles that govern network structures, network functionalities and behaviors of networks, the journal seeks articles on understanding, prediction, and control of structures and behaviors of networks. Another trans-disciplinary focus of the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering is the interactions between and co-evolution of different genres of networks.