{"title":"Stability of Networked Evolutionary Games With Randomly Mixed Two-Level Reasoning","authors":"Jiahao Li;Yong Ding;Yuqian Guo;Weihua Gui","doi":"10.1109/TCNS.2025.3526328","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the stability of finite networked evolutionary games (NEGs) considering randomly available second-order neighbors' information. A new strategy update rule (SUR) with randomly mixed two-level reasoning is proposed. The idea behind two-level reasoning is that each player predicts his/her neighbors' strategies based on the second-order neighbors' information if available, and then updates his/her own strategy accordingly. Since this information is only available randomly, the induced SUR is a mixed SUR based on one-level and two-level reasoning. The algebraic form of the profile dynamical system is derived, and the profile's transition probability matrix is calculated. Based on these, necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium (NE) stability are proposed. In addition, it is proved that under mild probability conditions, if an NE of an NEG with one-level reasoning is stable, then it is also stable for the NEG with the induced randomly mixed two-level reasoning. An illustrative example is provided to demonstrate the proposed results.","PeriodicalId":56023,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems","volume":"12 2","pages":"1466-1477"},"PeriodicalIF":4.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10829792/","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article examines the stability of finite networked evolutionary games (NEGs) considering randomly available second-order neighbors' information. A new strategy update rule (SUR) with randomly mixed two-level reasoning is proposed. The idea behind two-level reasoning is that each player predicts his/her neighbors' strategies based on the second-order neighbors' information if available, and then updates his/her own strategy accordingly. Since this information is only available randomly, the induced SUR is a mixed SUR based on one-level and two-level reasoning. The algebraic form of the profile dynamical system is derived, and the profile's transition probability matrix is calculated. Based on these, necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium (NE) stability are proposed. In addition, it is proved that under mild probability conditions, if an NE of an NEG with one-level reasoning is stable, then it is also stable for the NEG with the induced randomly mixed two-level reasoning. An illustrative example is provided to demonstrate the proposed results.
期刊介绍:
The IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems is committed to the timely publication of high-impact papers at the intersection of control systems and network science. In particular, the journal addresses research on the analysis, design and implementation of networked control systems, as well as control over networks. Relevant work includes the full spectrum from basic research on control systems to the design of engineering solutions for automatic control of, and over, networks. The topics covered by this journal include: Coordinated control and estimation over networks, Control and computation over sensor networks, Control under communication constraints, Control and performance analysis issues that arise in the dynamics of networks used in application areas such as communications, computers, transportation, manufacturing, Web ranking and aggregation, social networks, biology, power systems, economics, Synchronization of activities across a controlled network, Stability analysis of controlled networks, Analysis of networks as hybrid dynamical systems.