Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, and Asymmetric Information: Evidence From Jordan

IF 4.8 Q1 BUSINESS
Yousef Shahwan
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Abstract

By giving investors clear and thorough information to assist them in making decisions, disclosures about CSR lessen asymmetric information. Even while some analysts may minimize CSR information, it is becoming increasingly significant in developing nations with low levels of openness, such as Jordan. Information on CSR is essential for lowering hazard and fostering confidence in firm governance as socially conscious investment grows. The necessity of harmonizing stakeholder and manager interests is highlighted by the fact that asymmetric information, in which one side possesses a greater understanding than the other, may result in inconsistencies and possibly market failures. The research aimed to examine the moderating effect of corporate governance by employing concentrated ownership and board structure and activities in the relation between corporate social responsibility and asymmetric information. To achieve the aim of this research, the data were collected from the annual reports of the companies which were published on the Amman Stock Exchange website for the years 2013 to 2023. This research finds that the disclosure of corporate social responsibility has a negative effect on information asymmetry, and this shows that corporate social responsibility disclosure decreases the level of information asymmetry. Furthermore, the results show that specific concentrated ownership and board structure and activities moderate the association between the disclosure of corporate social responsibility and information asymmetry by affecting the disclosure of information as well as how investors perceive it. More precisely, the bid-ask spread is negatively impacted by the independence of the board, duality of CEO, and size of the board. These results reflect the important effect of the moderator factors in reducing asymmetric information and improving the relationship of CSR with regard to asymmetric information. Information asymmetry and CSR disclosure are positively correlated when the independence of the board moderates. Finally, the study's findings have both theoretical and practical implications. For example, CSR could be used by management to identify and employ the finest individuals and strengthen ties among management acting as agents for different shareholders and blockholders acting as principals.

企业社会责任、公司治理与信息不对称:来自约旦的证据
通过向投资者提供清晰和全面的信息以帮助他们做出决策,企业社会责任的披露减少了信息的不对称。尽管一些分析人士可能会将企业社会责任信息最小化,但在约旦等开放程度较低的发展中国家,企业社会责任信息正变得越来越重要。随着社会意识投资的增长,有关企业社会责任的信息对于降低风险和培养对企业治理的信心至关重要。信息不对称(一方比另一方了解更多)可能导致不一致,甚至可能导致市场失灵,这一事实凸显了协调利益相关者和管理者利益的必要性。本研究旨在通过股权集中度、董事会结构和活动考察公司治理在企业社会责任与信息不对称关系中的调节作用。为了实现本研究的目的,数据收集自2013年至2023年在安曼证券交易所网站上发布的公司年度报告。本研究发现,企业社会责任披露对信息不对称具有负向影响,这说明企业社会责任披露降低了信息不对称水平。此外,特定的股权集中度、董事会结构和活动通过影响信息披露以及投资者对信息披露的看法,调节了企业社会责任披露与信息不对称之间的关联。更确切地说,买卖价差受到董事会独立性、CEO的双重身份和董事会规模的负面影响。这些结果反映了调节因子在减少信息不对称和改善企业社会责任与信息不对称的关系方面的重要作用。当董事会独立性缓和时,信息不对称与企业社会责任披露呈正相关。最后,该研究的发现具有理论和实践意义。例如,企业社会责任可以被管理层用来识别和雇用最优秀的个人,并加强管理层之间的联系,作为不同股东的代理人和作为委托人的大股东。
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来源期刊
Business Strategy and Development
Business Strategy and Development Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)
CiteScore
5.80
自引率
6.70%
发文量
33
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