Forward Legal Anonymous Group Pairing-Onion Routing for Mobile Opportunistic Networks

Abstract

Mobile Opportunistic Networks (MONs) often experience frequent interruptions in end-to-end connections, which increases the likelihood of message loss during delivery and makes users more susceptible to various cyber attacks. However, most currently proposed anonymous routing protocols are primarily designed for networks with stable connections, making it challenging to protect user identities in MONs. To address these challenges, we propose FLAG-POR (Forward Legal Anonymous Group Pairing-Onion Routing), a novel anonymous routing protocol specifically tailored to enhance message delivery anonymity and security in MONs. Specifically, we abstract the mobile opportunistic network as a contact graph. By introducing the concept of “groups” into the pairing-onion routing protocol, which encrypts messages and relay nodes layer by layer, we develop a novel group-based pairing-onion routing protocol. This protocol ensures message confidentiality and relay node anonymity, while also improving message forwarding rates, as any node within a group can potentially act as a relay. To ensure message authenticity, we employ the efficient SM2 signing algorithm to generate signatures for the message source. Furthermore, by incorporating parameters such as the public key validity period and master key validity period into the group pairing-onion routing protocol, we achieve forward security in message delivery. We conduct a thorough theoretical analysis of the protocol’s security and performance. The experimental results demonstrate that our FLAG-POR protocol outperforms baseline anonymous protocols in terms of delivery success rate, traceability rate, path anonymity, and node anonymity. Additionally, the FLAG-POR scheme effectively resists three potential threats to the routing system: collusion attack threat, node identification threat, and path identification threat, in any situation.