Strategic counterfeit suppression on online platform: Considering network externalities and online consumer reviews in a two-period framework

IF 10 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL
Haiqing Song , Kai Cao , Housheng Duan
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The presence of counterfeiters on online platforms often has detrimental effects on consumers, authentic sellers, and the platforms themselves, highlighting the need for effective anti-counterfeit policies. In addition, consumer purchasing behavior is influenced not only by price and quality but also by online consumer reviews (OCRs). In this paper, we examine a two-sided market scenario where authentic sellers and counterfeiters coexist on an online platform, and consumers can use OCRs to assess product quality. We construct a two-period model to investigate how anti-counterfeiting efforts and pricing decisions by the platform and sellers evolve over time, considering the impact of network externalities and OCRs. Our findings reveal that without OCRs, increased anti-counterfeiting efforts consistently align with changes in retail prices and authentic sellers' profits. Interestingly, with OCRs, the platform can adopt one of two strategies: “relaxed first, then strict” or “strict first, then relaxed”, each with its own benefits, and the platform's efforts to combat counterfeiters do not consistently increase, and platform profits are not necessarily compromised. Furthermore, we find that the online platform earns lower profits with OCRs than without them. Contrary to past literature, our study shows that sellers may benefit from OCRs when there is a significant reference effect or low production costs. Additionally, the comparison of social welfare across different scenarios reveals that OCRs do not always enhance social welfare.
网络平台的假货战略打击:考虑网络外部性和网络消费者评论的两期框架
在线平台上的造假者往往对消费者、正品卖家和平台本身产生不利影响,这凸显了有效打假政策的必要性。此外,消费者购买行为不仅受到价格和质量的影响,还受到在线消费者评论(ocr)的影响。本文研究了一个正品卖家和假冒商家共存的双边市场场景,消费者可以使用ocr来评估产品质量。考虑到网络外部性和ocr的影响,我们构建了一个两期模型来研究平台和卖家的打假努力和定价决策如何随着时间的推移而演变。我们的研究结果表明,如果没有ocr,打假力度的增加与零售价格和正品卖家利润的变化一致。有趣的是,对于ocr,平台可以采取“先放松后严格”或“先严格后放松”两种策略中的一种,每种策略都有各自的好处,平台打击假冒伪劣的力度不会持续加大,平台的利润也不一定会受到损害。此外,我们发现有ocr的在线平台的利润低于没有ocr的在线平台。与以往文献相反,我们的研究表明,当参考效应显著或生产成本较低时,卖家可能会从ocr中受益。此外,对不同情景下社会福利的比较表明,ocr并不总是能提高社会福利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
International Journal of Production Economics
International Journal of Production Economics 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
21.40
自引率
7.50%
发文量
266
审稿时长
52 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.
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