{"title":"The influence mechanism of controlling shareholders' equity pledges on corporate risk-taking","authors":"Qin Guo , Yuanping Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.frl.2025.107564","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper employs China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2023 as the research sample to examine the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge behavior on corporate risk-taking. It also tests the moderating role of the threat of share withdrawal by non-controlling major shareholders. The findings reveal that controlling shareholders' equity pledges result in lower levels of corporate risk-taking. Further analysis indicates that the threat of withdrawal by non-controlling major shareholders mitigates the negative correlation between controlling shareholders' equity pledges and corporate risk-taking. Additionally, we discover that the quality of disclosure has a mediating effect in controlling shareholders' equity pledges, which reduces corporate risk-taking.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":12167,"journal":{"name":"Finance Research Letters","volume":"82 ","pages":"Article 107564"},"PeriodicalIF":7.4000,"publicationDate":"2025-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Finance Research Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612325008232","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper employs China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2023 as the research sample to examine the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge behavior on corporate risk-taking. It also tests the moderating role of the threat of share withdrawal by non-controlling major shareholders. The findings reveal that controlling shareholders' equity pledges result in lower levels of corporate risk-taking. Further analysis indicates that the threat of withdrawal by non-controlling major shareholders mitigates the negative correlation between controlling shareholders' equity pledges and corporate risk-taking. Additionally, we discover that the quality of disclosure has a mediating effect in controlling shareholders' equity pledges, which reduces corporate risk-taking.
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