How high‐performance outliers affect relative entrepreneurial entry on competing crowdfunding platforms

IF 5.4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Anil R. Doshi
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research SummaryEntrepreneurs have increasingly entered digital crowdfunding platforms as a viable option for acquiring capital. This paper examines how high‐performance outliers—projects that raised substantial amounts of capital—affect other entrepreneurs' decisions to enter crowdfunding. The present study focuses on the two largest rewards‐based crowdfunding platforms, Kickstarter and Indiegogo. Results indicate that, following outliers, entry was relatively higher on the platform with less restrictive, entrant‐friendly governance (i.e., Indiegogo). This effect was more pronounced among low‐quality entrants and moderated by projects in categories that have higher capital requirements. The findings suggest that differences in platform governance influence how subsequent entrepreneurial entrants behave.Managerial SummaryEntrepreneurs use crowdfunding as a viable source of capital. This paper looks at how outliers—projects that raise substantial capital—affected subsequent entry decisions by other entrepreneurs onto the two largest platforms, Kickstarter and Indiegogo. Outliers led to relatively more projects joining Indiegogo, but those projects were disproportionately of low quality. Projects in categories that typically seek more money disproportionately joined Kickstarter. When considered in the context of platform competition, not only does platform governance affect levels of entry on a platform, it also alters the relative mix of entrants that join each platform.
高绩效异常值如何影响竞争众筹平台的相对创业进入
越来越多的企业家将数字众筹平台作为获取资本的可行选择。本文考察了高绩效异常值(即筹集了大量资金的项目)如何影响其他企业家进入众筹的决策。本研究的重点是两个最大的基于奖励的众筹平台,Kickstarter和Indiegogo。结果表明,在异常值之后,在限制较少的平台上,进入率相对较高,对进入者友好的治理(即Indiegogo)。这种影响在低质量的进入者中更为明显,并且在资本要求较高的项目类别中有所缓和。研究结果表明,平台治理的差异会影响后续创业进入者的行为。企业家将众筹作为可行的资金来源。本文考察了异常值项目——筹集大量资金的项目——如何影响其他企业家随后进入两个最大的平台Kickstarter和Indiegogo的决策。异常值导致相对更多的项目加入Indiegogo,但这些项目不成比例地低质量。那些通常需要更多资金的项目加入了Kickstarter。当考虑到平台竞争的背景时,平台治理不仅会影响平台的进入水平,还会改变加入每个平台的进入者的相对组合。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
11.10
自引率
1.60%
发文量
31
期刊介绍: The Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal is a research journal that publishes original work recommended by a developmental, double-blind review process conducted by peer scholars. Strategic entrepreneurship involves innovation and subsequent changes which add value to society and which change societal life in ways which have significant, sustainable, and durable consequences. The SEJ is international in scope and acknowledges theory- and evidence-based research conducted and/or applied in all regions of the world. It is devoted to content and quality standards based on scientific method, relevant theory, tested or testable propositions, and appropriate data and evidence, all replicable by others, and all representing original contributions. The SEJ values contributions which lead to improved practice of managing organizations as they deal with the entrepreneurial process involving imagination, insight, invention, and innovation and the inevitable changes and transformations that result and benefit society.
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