{"title":"On the Parameterized Complexity of Controlling Amendment and Successive Winners","authors":"Yongjie Yang","doi":"10.1007/s00453-025-01304-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The amendment procedure and the successive procedure have been widely employed in parliamentary and legislative decision making and have undergone extensive study in the literature from various perspectives. However, investigating them through the lens of computational complexity theory has not been as thoroughly conducted as for many other prevalent voting procedures heretofore. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one paper which explores the complexity of several strategic voting problems under these two procedures, prior to our current work. To provide a better understanding of to what extent the two procedures resist strategic behavior, we study the parameterized complexity of constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting voters/candidates for both procedures. To enhance the generalizability of our results, we also examine a more generalized form of the amendment procedure. Our exploration yields a comprehensive (parameterized) complexity landscape of these problems with respect to numerous parameters.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50824,"journal":{"name":"Algorithmica","volume":"87 6","pages":"842 - 907"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Algorithmica","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00453-025-01304-0","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The amendment procedure and the successive procedure have been widely employed in parliamentary and legislative decision making and have undergone extensive study in the literature from various perspectives. However, investigating them through the lens of computational complexity theory has not been as thoroughly conducted as for many other prevalent voting procedures heretofore. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one paper which explores the complexity of several strategic voting problems under these two procedures, prior to our current work. To provide a better understanding of to what extent the two procedures resist strategic behavior, we study the parameterized complexity of constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting voters/candidates for both procedures. To enhance the generalizability of our results, we also examine a more generalized form of the amendment procedure. Our exploration yields a comprehensive (parameterized) complexity landscape of these problems with respect to numerous parameters.
期刊介绍：
Algorithmica is an international journal which publishes theoretical papers on algorithms that address problems arising in practical areas, and experimental papers of general appeal for practical importance or techniques. The development of algorithms is an integral part of computer science. The increasing complexity and scope of computer applications makes the design of efficient algorithms essential.
Algorithmica covers algorithms in applied areas such as: VLSI, distributed computing, parallel processing, automated design, robotics, graphics, data base design, software tools, as well as algorithms in fundamental areas such as sorting, searching, data structures, computational geometry, and linear programming.
In addition, the journal features two special sections: Application Experience, presenting findings obtained from applications of theoretical results to practical situations, and Problems, offering short papers presenting problems on selected topics of computer science.
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