A blockchain-based resource sharing incentivization mechanism for multi-to-multi in compute first networking

IF 4.4 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE
Peng Liu, Zixu Zhang, Chenhao Ren, Hailong You
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The explosive growth of data and the rapid development of algorithms have placed increasing demands on computing power. Compute first networking (CFN) can connect cloud, edge and terminal resources and meet the ubiquitous resource demands, becoming an important technology for future computing power development. However, the application premise of CFN is the resource sharing between different entities, but selfish users are usually unwilling to share their own resources. Therefore, how to motivate more users to participate in resource sharing and jointly maintain the CFN is an important issue. In this paper, we designed an incentive mechanism that considers both security, user privacy, fair pricing, and resource allocation schemes to maximize the utilities for both parties. Firstly, we design a resource trading system based on layered blockchain to ensure system security and user privacy. Secondly, the incentive process is modeled considering both supply–demand relationships, pricing and resource allocation strategies. The model is then split into two sub-problems of supply–demand matching and resource trading. An optimization method based on reinforcement learning is proposed to solve complex multi-to-multi matching problems. The resource trading process is modeled as a more realistic multi-to-multi Stackelberg game problem, the Nash equilibrium point is obtained to maximize the utilities of both parties through the game process of supply and demand. Simulations and security analysis show that the incentive method proposed in this paper is able to ensure data security and user privacy, while achieving the goal of motivating users to participate in resource sharing with lower costs.

Abstract Image

基于区块链的多对多计算优先网络资源共享激励机制
数据的爆炸式增长和算法的快速发展对计算能力提出了越来越高的要求。计算优先网络(CFN)可以连接云、边缘和终端资源,满足无处不在的资源需求,成为未来计算能力发展的重要技术。然而,CFN的应用前提是不同实体之间的资源共享,而自私的用户通常不愿意共享自己的资源。因此,如何激励更多的用户参与资源共享,共同维护CFN是一个重要的问题。在本文中,我们设计了一种同时考虑安全性、用户隐私、公平定价和资源分配方案的激励机制,以最大化双方的效用。首先,我们设计了一个基于分层区块链的资源交易系统,以保证系统的安全性和用户的隐私性。其次,考虑供需关系、定价和资源配置策略,对激励过程进行建模。然后将模型分解为供需匹配和资源交易两个子问题。针对复杂的多对多匹配问题,提出了一种基于强化学习的优化方法。将资源交易过程建模为一个更为现实的多对多Stackelberg博弈问题,通过供需博弈过程求得双方效用最大化的纳什均衡点。仿真和安全性分析表明,本文提出的激励方法能够在保证数据安全和用户隐私的同时,以较低的成本达到激励用户参与资源共享的目的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Computer Networks
Computer Networks 工程技术-电信学
CiteScore
10.80
自引率
3.60%
发文量
434
审稿时长
8.6 months
期刊介绍: Computer Networks is an international, archival journal providing a publication vehicle for complete coverage of all topics of interest to those involved in the computer communications networking area. The audience includes researchers, managers and operators of networks as well as designers and implementors. The Editorial Board will consider any material for publication that is of interest to those groups.
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