{"title":"Does tight monetary policy threaten the soundness of Korean banks?","authors":"Ji-Yong Seo","doi":"10.1111/apel.12434","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study analysed the relationship between the implementation of the Central Bank of Korea's tight monetary policy due to the recent deepening of inflation and the soundness of Korean banks. This study focused on the fact that the recently published research results of Jung (2023) were different from previous research results. The traditional result is that tight monetary policy reduces loan defaults by shrinking banks' lending capacity. However, Jung (2023), who analysed banks in the EU, claims that loan defaults do not increase despite easing monetary policy. This study empirically analysed the risk indicators that evaluate the financial soundness of banks by dividing them into the financial insolvency, financing costs, recapitalization, and risk holding. The research results are as follows. First, tight monetary policy reduces banks' loan defaults in line with Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) instead of Jung (2023). Second, banks' financing costs increased due to the tight monetary policy with same context to the claims of Borio and Hofmann (2017) and Jung (2023). Third, banks' recapitalization level actually decreased due to tight monetary policy as argument of Jung (2023). Fourth, tight monetary policy had no significant relationship with banks' risk taking behaviour in consistent with Diamond and Rajan (2011) and Jimenez et al. (2012). In conclusion, tight monetary policy reduces insolvency of loans, but increases potential risk factors such as increased financing costs and reduced recapitalization in the future. Therefore, this study suggests novel findings and policy challenges.</p>","PeriodicalId":44776,"journal":{"name":"Asian-Pacific Economic Literature","volume":"39 1","pages":"131-151"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian-Pacific Economic Literature","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/apel.12434","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study analysed the relationship between the implementation of the Central Bank of Korea's tight monetary policy due to the recent deepening of inflation and the soundness of Korean banks. This study focused on the fact that the recently published research results of Jung (2023) were different from previous research results. The traditional result is that tight monetary policy reduces loan defaults by shrinking banks' lending capacity. However, Jung (2023), who analysed banks in the EU, claims that loan defaults do not increase despite easing monetary policy. This study empirically analysed the risk indicators that evaluate the financial soundness of banks by dividing them into the financial insolvency, financing costs, recapitalization, and risk holding. The research results are as follows. First, tight monetary policy reduces banks' loan defaults in line with Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) instead of Jung (2023). Second, banks' financing costs increased due to the tight monetary policy with same context to the claims of Borio and Hofmann (2017) and Jung (2023). Third, banks' recapitalization level actually decreased due to tight monetary policy as argument of Jung (2023). Fourth, tight monetary policy had no significant relationship with banks' risk taking behaviour in consistent with Diamond and Rajan (2011) and Jimenez et al. (2012). In conclusion, tight monetary policy reduces insolvency of loans, but increases potential risk factors such as increased financing costs and reduced recapitalization in the future. Therefore, this study suggests novel findings and policy challenges.
本研究分析了韩国中央银行因最近通货膨胀加剧而实施的紧缩货币政策与韩国银行健全性之间的关系。此次研究的重点是最近发表的Jung(2023)的研究结果与以往的研究结果不同。传统的结果是,从紧的货币政策通过收缩银行的放贷能力来减少贷款违约。然而,Jung(2023)分析了欧盟的银行,声称尽管货币政策宽松,贷款违约并未增加。本研究将评估银行财务稳健性的风险指标分为财务资不抵债、融资成本、资本重组和风险持有四个方面进行实证分析。研究结果如下:首先,从紧的货币政策减少了银行的贷款违约,这与Gambacorta和Mistrulli(2004)而不是Jung(2023)的结论一致。其次,由于货币政策从紧,银行的融资成本增加,这与Borio和Hofmann(2017)和Jung(2023)的主张相同。第三,正如Jung(2023)所言,由于紧缩的货币政策,银行的资本重组水平实际上下降了。第四,从紧的货币政策与银行的风险承担行为没有显著关系,这与Diamond and Rajan(2011)和Jimenez et al.(2012)一致。总之,从紧的货币政策减少了贷款的资不抵债,但增加了潜在的风险因素,如未来融资成本的增加和资本重组的减少。因此,本研究提出了新的发现和政策挑战。
期刊介绍:
Asian-Pacific Economic Literature (APEL) is an essential resource for anyone interested in economic development in the Asian-Pacific region. With original articles on topical policy issues, literature surveys, and abstracts of articles from over 300 journals, APEL makes it easy for you to keep ahead of the proliferating research on this dynamic and increasingly important region. Read by politicians, journalists, businesspeople, policy-makers, industrialists and academics, APEL avoids technical jargon, and is the only journal devoted to one-stop, in-depth reporting of research on the development of Asian-Pacific economies.