Should underwriters be trusted? Reducing agency costs through primary market supervision

IF 5.5 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Sean Foley , Xiaolu Hu , Haozhi Huang , Jiang Li
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine the mandated introduction of a supervised auction framework within China's primary bond market. This regulatory intervention resulted in a substantial reduction in debt costs for Chinese Bond issuers, primarily attributed to the alleviation of agency conflicts between underwriters and issuers. Leveraging unique bidder-level data obtained from a lead underwriter, our study provides replicable tools to discern collusive bidding behavior. This sheds light on instances of artificially inflated bond yields, highlighting economically burdensome practices. Our findings can assist regulators, issuers, and investors engaged in unsupervised auction mechanisms. Our insights offer potential enhancements to regulatory frameworks and operational efficiency across various sectors, including securities issuance, construction projects, and procurement.
保险商应该被信任吗?通过一级市场监管降低代理成本
我们研究了在中国一级债券市场强制引入监督拍卖框架的情况。这一监管干预导致中国债券发行人的债务成本大幅降低,主要原因是承销商和发行人之间的代理冲突得到缓解。利用从主承销商那里获得的独特投标人数据,我们的研究提供了可复制的工具来辨别串通投标行为。这揭示了人为抬高债券收益率的例子,凸显了经济负担沉重的做法。我们的研究结果可以帮助监管机构、发行人和投资者参与无监管的拍卖机制。我们的见解为证券发行、建筑项目和采购等各个领域的监管框架和运营效率提供了潜在的改进。
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来源期刊
British Accounting Review
British Accounting Review BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
8.60
自引率
3.90%
发文量
39
审稿时长
76 days
期刊介绍: The British Accounting Review*is pleased to publish original scholarly papers across the whole spectrum of accounting and finance. The journal is eclectic and pluralistic and contributions are welcomed across a wide range of research methodologies (e.g. analytical, archival, experimental, survey and qualitative case methods) and topics (e.g. financial accounting, management accounting, finance and financial management, auditing, public sector accounting, social and environmental accounting; accounting education and accounting history), evidence from UK and non-UK sources are equally acceptable.
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