A Stackelberg game analysis of livestreaming sales and product returns in e-commerce

Fangfang Wei , Hao Hao , Pourya Pourhejazy , Zhaoran Xu
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Abstract

Many enterprises selling products on e-commerce platforms have adopted livestreaming to increase sales volume. A high return rate, caused by an exaggerated presentation of the products, can overwhelm the supply chain. Livestreaming considering the product return issue has received little attention in the academic literature. Building on the existing knowledge of the traditional e-commerce sales model, a Stackelberg game model led by an apparel enterprise is established to study livestreaming as a new sales strategy, considering the return rates, the livestreaming anchors’ commission, and the products’ diminishing time-value. A comparative analysis investigates whether the livestreaming sales model increases profitability, considering that some products may be returned. The results show that the return rate has a meaningfully different impact on the optimal price and sales volume of both the apparel enterprise and the third-party liquidation seller. In livestreaming sales, if the commission charged by the anchor passes a certain threshold, the apparel enterprise’s profit will be less than its traditional e-commerce profit, even with a low return rate. It is also found that a higher diminishing time-value coefficient of apparel may correspond to lower pricing by the third-party liquidation seller.
电子商务中直播销售与产品退货的Stackelberg博弈分析
许多在电子商务平台上销售产品的企业都采用了直播来增加销售额。由夸张的产品展示引起的高退货率可能会压垮供应链。在学术文献中,考虑产品退货问题的直播很少受到关注。在传统电商销售模式已有知识的基础上,建立了以服装企业为主导的Stackelberg游戏模型,考虑退货率、主播佣金、产品时间价值递减等因素,研究了直播作为一种新的销售策略。一项对比分析调查了直播销售模式是否增加了盈利能力,考虑到一些产品可能会被退货。研究结果表明,退货率对服装企业和第三方清算卖家的最优价格和最优销量的影响均有显著差异。在直播销售中,如果主播收取的佣金超过一定的门槛,服装企业的利润就会低于其传统电商的利润,甚至回报率也很低。研究还发现,服装的递减时间价值系数越高,第三方清算卖家的定价越低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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