Mechanism Design for Blockchain Order Books Against Selfish Miners

IF 6.7 2区计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering Pub Date : 2025-02-24 DOI:10.1109/TNSE.2025.3544686

Yunshu Liu;Lingjie Duan

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In blockchain-based order book systems, buyers and sellers trade assets, while it is miners to match them and include their transactions in the blockchain. It is found that many miners behave selfishly and myopically, prioritizing transactions with high fees and ignoring many desirable matches that could enhance social welfare. Existing blockchain mechanisms fail to address this issue by overlooking miners' selfish behaviors. To our best knowledge, this work presents the first analytical study to quantify and understand buyer and seller transaction fee choices and selfish miners' transaction matching strategies, proving an infinitely large price of anarchy (PoA) for social welfare loss. To mitigate this, we propose an adjustable block size mechanism that is easy to implement without altering the existing decentralized protocols and still allows buyers and sellers to freely decide transaction fees and miners to selfishly match. The analysis is challenging, as pure strategy Nash equilibria do not always exist, requiring the analysis of many buyers' or sellers' interactive mixed-strategy distributions. Moreover, the system designer may even lack information about each buyer's or seller's bid/ask prices and trading quantities. Nevertheless, our mechanism achieves a well-bounded PoA, and under the homogeneous-quantity trading for non-fungible tokens (NFT), it attains a PoA of 1 with no social welfare loss. We implement our mechanism on a local instance of Ethereum to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. Experiments based on the realistic dataset demonstrate that our mechanism achieves social optimum for homogeneous-quantity trading like NFT. It can enhance social welfare up to 3.7 times compared to the existing order book benchmarks for heterogeneous-quantity trading of Bitcoin tokens. It exhibits robustness against random variations in buyers and sellers.

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区块链订单对自私矿工的机制设计

在基于区块链的订单系统中，买家和卖家交易资产，而矿工则匹配他们并将他们的交易纳入区块链。研究发现，许多矿工的行为自私和短视，优先考虑高费用的交易，忽视了许多可以提高社会福利的理想匹配。现有区块链机制忽视了矿工的自私行为，未能解决这一问题。据我们所知，这项工作提出了第一个量化和理解买方和卖方交易费用选择和自私矿工交易匹配策略的分析研究，证明了社会福利损失的无限大无政府状态价格（PoA）。为了缓解这一问题，我们提出了一种可调整的区块大小机制，该机制在不改变现有去中心化协议的情况下易于实现，并且仍然允许买卖双方自由决定交易费用，矿工可以自私地匹配。这种分析具有挑战性，因为纯策略纳什均衡并不总是存在，需要分析许多买方或卖方的交互式混合策略分布。此外，系统设计者甚至可能缺乏关于每个买方或卖方的买入价/卖出价和交易数量的信息。然而，我们的机制实现了一个有界的PoA，并且在非可替代代币（NFT）的同质数量交易下，它实现了1的PoA，没有社会福利损失。我们在以太坊的本地实例上实现了我们的机制，以证明我们方法的可行性。基于现实数据集的实验表明，我们的机制可以实现NFT等同质量交易的社会最优。与现有的比特币异质数量交易订单基准相比，它可以提高社会福利3.7倍。它对买家和卖家的随机变化表现出鲁棒性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering Engineering-Control and Systems Engineering

CiteScore

12.60

自引率

9.10%

发文量

393

期刊介绍： The proposed journal, called the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering (TNSE), is committed to timely publishing of peer-reviewed technical articles that deal with the theory and applications of network science and the interconnections among the elements in a system that form a network. In particular, the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering publishes articles on understanding, prediction, and control of structures and behaviors of networks at the fundamental level. The types of networks covered include physical or engineered networks, information networks, biological networks, semantic networks, economic networks, social networks, and ecological networks. Aimed at discovering common principles that govern network structures, network functionalities and behaviors of networks, the journal seeks articles on understanding, prediction, and control of structures and behaviors of networks. Another trans-disciplinary focus of the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering is the interactions between and co-evolution of different genres of networks.