An inter-subgroup compensation mechanism by Nash bargaining game for managing non-cooperative behavior in group decision making

Abstract

Non-cooperative behavior exhibited by DMs when they must make excessive interest compromises hinders the achievement of group consensus. This study develops an inter-subgroup compensation mechanism using the Nash bargaining game under the minimum cost consensus model (MCCM) framework to managing non-cooperative behavior. First, a cooperative acceptability index (CAI) based on compromise limit costs is proposed to objectively identify non-cooperative behavior. By quantifying the acceptable compromise limit costs, the CAI ensures that consensus adjustments remain within acceptable bounds. Then, an inter-subgroup compensation mechanism is designed using the Nash bargaining game from the perspective of Kaldor–Hicks improvement. This mechanism enables cooperative DMs to incentivize non-cooperative peers via resource transfers, achieving dual optimization by minimizing collective costs and ensuring individual acceptability. Finally, a community renewal application example and comparison analysis are provided to illustrate the efficacy of the proposed approach.