{"title":"Mean field hierarchical control for production output adjustment with noisy sticky prices","authors":"Bing-Chang Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.automatica.2025.112260","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper is concerned with the hierarchical decentralized solution to mean field production output adjustment. We first introduce a mean field output adjustment model for many firms in a market, where the price is sticky and regulated by a government. Under a given policy of the regulator, we first tackle a centralized game problem, and obtain a system of coupled forward–backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). By decoupling the high-dimensional FBSDEs, a Nash equilibrium strategy is designed for competitive firms. After applying firms’ strategies, we construct a decentralized strategy of the regulator by solving an optimal control problem driven by FBSDEs. By perturbation analysis, the proposed decentralized strategy is shown to be an <span><math><mi>ɛ</mi></math></span>-Stackelberg equilibrium.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":55413,"journal":{"name":"Automatica","volume":"176 ","pages":"Article 112260"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Automatica","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0005109825001529","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the hierarchical decentralized solution to mean field production output adjustment. We first introduce a mean field output adjustment model for many firms in a market, where the price is sticky and regulated by a government. Under a given policy of the regulator, we first tackle a centralized game problem, and obtain a system of coupled forward–backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). By decoupling the high-dimensional FBSDEs, a Nash equilibrium strategy is designed for competitive firms. After applying firms’ strategies, we construct a decentralized strategy of the regulator by solving an optimal control problem driven by FBSDEs. By perturbation analysis, the proposed decentralized strategy is shown to be an -Stackelberg equilibrium.
期刊介绍:
Automatica is a leading archival publication in the field of systems and control. The field encompasses today a broad set of areas and topics, and is thriving not only within itself but also in terms of its impact on other fields, such as communications, computers, biology, energy and economics. Since its inception in 1963, Automatica has kept abreast with the evolution of the field over the years, and has emerged as a leading publication driving the trends in the field.
After being founded in 1963, Automatica became a journal of the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC) in 1969. It features a characteristic blend of theoretical and applied papers of archival, lasting value, reporting cutting edge research results by authors across the globe. It features articles in distinct categories, including regular, brief and survey papers, technical communiqués, correspondence items, as well as reviews on published books of interest to the readership. It occasionally publishes special issues on emerging new topics or established mature topics of interest to a broad audience.
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