Super conflict resolution approach based on minimum loss considering altruistic behavior and fairness concern

Abstract

Due to difference in strength, power, or status among decision makers (DMs), traditional strategic conflict may be evolved into a super conflict problem where a powerful DM can force others to approach his strategy although other DMs suffer loss. For instance, the government can mobilize relevant enterprises to engage in ecological and environmental governance. Also, DMs may conduct irrational behaviors during negotiations, such as altruistic behavior and fairness concern. To guarantee interests of DMs and sustainable development of decision system, exploring the equilibrium strategy and state that resolves such conflict problem becomes necessary. Therefore, based on theories of conflict analysis, group consensus, Nash bargaining, Berge equilibrium and fairness theory, this paper constructs a super conflict resolution model. Firstly, this paper defines a super conflict information system by introducing the concept of ‘strategy’ and DMs’ information vectors containing DMs’ evaluation values regarding conflict states. Then from the perspective of group negotiation and consensus, we divide the super conflict resolution into three stages and construct a super conflict resolution model based on minimum loss. Considering coalitions’ altruistic behavior and fairness concern, we optimize the model by defining Berge equilibrium and fairness utility function. Finally, a case study of river basin pollution treatment verifies the validity and rationality of the proposed model.