Reforming an Envy-Free Matching

Abstract

We consider the problem of reforming an envy-free matching when each agent has a strict preference over items and is assigned a single item. Given an envy-free matching, we consider an operation to exchange the item of an agent with an unassigned item preferred by the agent that results in another envy-free matching. We repeat this operation as long as we can. We prove that the resulting envy-free matching is uniquely determined up to the choice of an initial envy-free matching, and can be found in polynomial time. We call the resulting matching a reformist envy-free matching, and study a shortest sequence to obtain the reformist envy-free matching from an initial envy-free matching. We prove that a shortest sequence is computationally hard to obtain. We also give polynomial-time algorithms when each agent accepts at most three items or each item is accepted by at most two agents. Inapproximability and fixed-parameter (in)tractability are also discussed.