Manufacturer’s encroachment strategies when facing the retail platform with AI-driven pricing

IF 6.7 1区 工程技术 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Wenhui Zhou, Yu Ding, Yanhong Gan, Wenting Ma
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The rapid development of artificial intelligence technology is facilitating the adoption of AI-driven personalized pricing. Retail platforms with a higher level of technology and a closer connection with consumers have taken the lead in adopting AI-driven pricing to improve pricing flexibility. In this paper, we explore the manufacturer’s encroachment strategies in the context of the retail platform’s adoption of AI-driven pricing by constructing a game-theoretic model, as well as clarifying the impact of the magnitude of AI capability on the profits of supply chain participants. We construct three channel structures, namely, a single-channel supply chain model without manufacturer encroachment, a dual-channel supply chain model with manufacturer uniform pricing encroachment, and a dual-channel supply chain model with manufacturer AI-driven pricing encroachment. The results show that manufacturer encroachment with uniform pricing does not lead to an increase in profit. However, the manufacturer can encroach with AI-driven pricing to gain benefits when the AI capability is high, the total cost of adding a direct channel and acquiring AI technology is low, and consumers’ valuation is high. We also find that increased AI capability benefits the manufacturer in any scenario, but not for the retail platform. In the single-channel scenario, enhanced AI capability can improve the retail platform’s profit if consumers’ valuation is relatively low. However, in the dual-channel scenarios where the manufacturer encroaches, enhanced AI capability is completely detrimental to the retail platform. This also brings a management insight to retail platforms that high AI capability may not necessarily boost profitability. Finally, we also conduct a case study to substantiate our claims.
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来源期刊
Computers & Industrial Engineering
Computers & Industrial Engineering 工程技术-工程:工业
CiteScore
12.70
自引率
12.70%
发文量
794
审稿时长
10.6 months
期刊介绍: Computers & Industrial Engineering (CAIE) is dedicated to researchers, educators, and practitioners in industrial engineering and related fields. Pioneering the integration of computers in research, education, and practice, industrial engineering has evolved to make computers and electronic communication integral to its domain. CAIE publishes original contributions focusing on the development of novel computerized methodologies to address industrial engineering problems. It also highlights the applications of these methodologies to issues within the broader industrial engineering and associated communities. The journal actively encourages submissions that push the boundaries of fundamental theories and concepts in industrial engineering techniques.
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