Kimberly Zayhowski, Sarah Roth, M. J. Westerfield, Makenna A. Martin, Kai Blumen, Harris T. Bland, Shelly W. McQuaid, Kathleen F. Mittendorf
{"title":"Navigating sexual orientation and gender identity data privacy concerns in United States genetics practices","authors":"Kimberly Zayhowski, Sarah Roth, M. J. Westerfield, Makenna A. Martin, Kai Blumen, Harris T. Bland, Shelly W. McQuaid, Kathleen F. Mittendorf","doi":"10.1002/jgc4.70008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent federal efforts, such as those by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, have expanded sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) data collection to improve healthcare equity, and several states mandate regular SOGI data collection in healthcare (examples in Hunter, <span>2021</span>; Oregon Health Authority, <span>2023</span>; Tsai, <span>2023</span>). Best practice recommendations in genetics healthcare also encourage SOGI data collection (Bland et al., <span>2024</span>; Jamal et al., <span>2024</span>). SOGI data allow the provision of accurate, culturally responsive genetics care. For example, healthcare professionals' (HCP) knowledge of patients' gender-affirming care facilitates accurate cancer risk assessments and management (Cortina et al., <span>2024</span>; Roth et al., <span>2024</span>; von Vaupel-Klein & Walsh, <span>2021</span>). Moreover, HCPs respecting patients' identities and family structures promotes trust and psychological safety (Call et al., <span>2021</span>; Huser et al., <span>2022</span>; McCann & Brown, <span>2018</span>; Roth et al., <span>2024</span>).</p><p>However, as we enter the second Trump administration, SOGI data documentation has concerning implications in the United States socio-political landscape. The previous Trump administration enacted overtly anti-LGBTQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, etc.) policies, including banning transgender and gender diverse (TGD) individuals from military service, attempting to define gender strictly based on sex assigned at birth, and rolling back LGBTQ+ patient protections granted during the Obama administration (Green et al., <span>2018</span>; Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, <span>2017</span>; Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of Authority, 45 CFR 92, <span>2020</span>). Despite re-expansion of LBGTQ+ federal legislative protections under the Biden administration, far-right anti-LGBTQ+ legislation has increased at the state level (American Civil Liberties Union, <span>2024</span>; Restar et al., <span>2024</span>). The 2024 Trump campaign and those of allied Congressional candidates promised additional anti-TGD policies, with Republicans spending over $222 million dollars on anti-TGD and anti-LGBTQ advertisements during this time (Simmons-Duffin, <span>2024</span>). The Trump administration is expected to prioritize policies targeting TGD individuals early in its tenure, as highlighted in its “Agenda 47” platform, with points including cutting funding to schools teaching “radical gender ideology” and barring “men from women's spaces” (Trump, <span>n.d.</span>). He was recently quoted saying, “It will be the policy of the United States that there are only two genders, male and female” (Monteil, <span>2024</span>). An upcoming Supreme Court decision (United States v. Skrmetti, Docket No. 23–477, <span>2024–2025</span>) will decide whether state legislation banning gender-affirming care for minors is legal. This climate exacerbates realistic patient fears that SOGI information could be used for harm (Thompson, <span>2016</span>). For example, amidst an anti-LGBTQ+ state government in 2023, Vanderbilt University Medical Center (VUMC) released the full medical records of TGD patients to the Tennessee Attorney General during a fraud investigation prompted by right-wing commentary that VUMC billed Medicaid for transgender healthcare (Bacallao, <span>2024</span>; Senate Finance Committee – Majority Staff, <span>2024</span>). This incident stoked TGD mistrust and demonstrated the potential for SOGI data weaponization (Kohli, <span>2023</span>; Lemberg, <span>2017</span>).</p><p>This author team comprises experts – most LGBTQ+ – in genetics healthcare and research who have advocated for inclusive SOGI data collection and usage practices in genetics. However, in the authors' collective experience, TGD patients are increasingly restricting identity disclosure and requesting “off-the-record” disclosure due to fear of the socio-political climate. This commentary explores the ethical implications of SOGI data documentation within genetics in the politically charged atmosphere of the United States.</p><p>The Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) restricts unauthorized disclosure of patient data but has limitations in safeguarding SOGI data (Clayton et al., <span>2024</span>). While the <span>US Department of Health and Human Services</span> previously issued guidance that gender-affirming care should be subjected to additional protections for explicit patient consent prior to release, except in limited circumstances (US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), <span>2021</span>, <span>2022</span>), it was vacated by a Texas District Court decision (State of Texas v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al. Document 74, 1183, <span>2022</span>). Further, this guidance did not cover SOGI data collected as part of demographics. Without these protections, healthcare institutions may be compelled to release SOGI data—including gender-affirming care data—to government agencies without patient consent. The VUMC case highlights HIPAA limitations, revealing that healthcare institutions may feel obligated to comply with non-subpoena, privacy-compromising government requests.</p><p>The lack of robust SOGI data protections in the face of rising political pressures underscores the urgent need for stronger privacy safeguarding of SOGI data from government-directed scrutiny. While the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) (<span>2008</span>) narrowly protects individuals against health insurance and employment discrimination, it does not protect individuals from having their genetic information used in other ways, such as in law enforcement or government investigations. Some states have more robust genetic protections than the federal provisions of GINA, but these vary widely and it is unclear whether they would protect from inquiries by federal entities (Suter, <span>2020</span>).</p><p>Further, genetic data collected as part of research is not always adequately cared for or protected. Some genetic data, such as sex chromosome composition, polygenic scores, and whole exome sequencing, could be used to query genetic origins of gender identity and sexual orientation in harmful ways and is especially vulnerable to misuse in secondary research datasets (Hamer et al., <span>2021</span>; Holm & Ploug, <span>2019</span>; Kraft & Mittendorf, <span>2024</span>; Maxmen, <span>2019</span>; Meyer et al., <span>2023</span>; Rajkovic et al., <span>2022</span>; Richardson et al., <span>2019</span>; Sabatello et al., <span>2022</span>). As others have highlighted, sociobehavioral genomics research is often conducted without appropriate consideration of confounding social variables that may otherwise explain apparent data linkages (Meyer et al., <span>2023</span>); such research can be used to enact harms against LGBTQ+ and other marginalized communities (Hamer et al., <span>2021</span>; Holm & Ploug, <span>2019</span>; Maxmen, <span>2019</span>; Panofsky et al., <span>2021</span>; Rajkovic et al., <span>2022</span>; Richardson et al., <span>2019</span>). LGBTQ+ individuals have emphasized the need for stringent protections and ethical guidelines (Hammack-Aviran et al., <span>2022</span>; Rajkovic et al., <span>2022</span>).</p><p>Genetic counseling research data are at particular risk for inquiries by law enforcement as much of this research is not funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), meaning that Certificates of Confidentiality – the most robust protection of data – are not automatically granted (Clayton et al., <span>2024</span>). Even NIH-funded research poses risks; the new NIH data sharing policy, which requires that researchers share data broadly with the public, offers little specific guidance on how to protect individual-level data from re-identification and little data governance guidance for secondary uses of such data (Kraft & Mittendorf, <span>2024</span>; National Institutes of Health (NIH), <span>2020</span>; Sabatello et al., <span>2022</span>; Xia et al., <span>2023</span>).</p><p>The 21st Century Cures Act (<span>2016</span>) directs greater EMR interoperability to facilitate seamless transfer of patient information across healthcare networks and improve care continuity. However, indiscriminate data exchange poses privacy risks. Data exchange-related privacy risks are a known phenomenon recognized by the informatics community as the “interoperability trap” (Arvisais-Anhalt et al., <span>2023</span>; Zubrzycki, <span>2022</span>). Once SOGI data are documented in a patient's EMR, it may be accessed by any HCP with an interoperable system (e.g., through Epic's Care Everywhere feature) without the patient's explicit understanding/consent.</p><p>SOGI-related data exchange to a health system in a state with anti-LGBTQ+ legislation could expose patients to legal scrutiny. Imagine a scenario where a TGD patient from a TGD-care restrictive state seeks gender-affirming care in another state. Not unlike risks for patients seeking out-of-state abortion and clinicians who provide them, shared EMR systems pose risks to patients receiving and clinicians providing gender-affirming care in legal states, potentially leading to interstate prosecution. Already, states are attempting to restrict out-of-state care for TGD minors; for example, Texas is attempting to investigate families seeking such care under the Texas provision of child abuse, though these investigations are presently blocked by the courts (Abbott v. Doe, No. 03-22-00126-CV, 2024 WL 1286316, <span>2024</span>; Opinion No. KP-0401, <span>2022</span>; Tucker & Riess, <span>2024</span>).</p><p>Expanded interoperability related to 21st Century Cures raises privacy concerns that specifically impact LGBTQ+ adolescents, whose confidentiality and access to gender-affirming care are largely dictated by state laws (Arvisais-Anhalt et al., <span>2023</span>; Sharko et al., <span>2022</span>; Zubrzycki, <span>2022</span>). Parents or guardians often have access to their child's EMR – either by default or through adolescent decision for parental/guardian proxy – revealing SOGI-related data, including demographics documentation of gender identity and sexual orientation, as well as reproductive and gender-affirming care. For instance, in states where the age of medical consent is under 18 or in states where the consent of only one parent is required for the provision of such care, access to the medical record by an unsupportive parent could endanger the child's well-being (Campbell, <span>n.d.</span>; Oregon Health Authority, <span>2019</span>).</p><p>Detailed pedigrees are essential for accurate genetic risk assessment, but pedigree documentation of TGD status creates precarity. The National Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC) recently updated its guideline to a “gender-first” pedigree approach, prioritizing gender over sex assigned at birth (Bennett et al., <span>2022</span>). While this is a meaningful step toward inclusivity, this guideline recommends capturing sex assigned at birth—thus clearly recording TGD status.</p><p>Recent literature recommends documenting TGD family members in pedigrees (Barnes et al., <span>2020</span>). While we recognize the importance of honoring family members' gender identities and ensuring an accurate assessment, recording this information in medical records must be approached with caution. TGD status documentation is potentially conducted without the family member's consent and could inadvertently place them at risk. Genetics HCPs must therefore balance providing inclusive, comprehensive clinical care with privacy protection responsibilities.</p><p>We assert that genetics HCPs, such as genetic counselors and geneticists, should have transparent conversations about privacy and documentation of SOGI status, followed by discussions about how organ systems, hormonal milieu, and surgical history affect care recommendations. Additional demographic factors relevant to genetic counseling, such as country of origin, may warrant similar privacy conversations (Callaghan et al., <span>2019</span>; Saadi et al., <span>2020</span>). Others have provided guidance for more inclusive clinical care (e.g., taking organ inventories for all cancer genetics patients to ensure anatomy- and history-based care), benefiting everyone without singling out LGBTQ+ individuals (Berro & Zayhowski, <span>2023</span>; Bland et al., <span>2024</span>; Kronk et al., <span>2022</span>; Motiff et al., <span>2024</span>; Pratt-Chapman et al., <span>2024</span>; Ruderman et al., <span>2021</span>; Schmidt & Rizzolo, <span>2017</span>; von Vaupel-Klein & Walsh, <span>2021</span>). Genetics HCPs should prioritize patient autonomy in documentation decisions (e.g., pedigree symbol choices, pronouns, partner(s) inclusion) while still providing comprehensive care recommendations (e.g., genetic risk assessment, screening/management recommendations) to the patient. Where these two may conflict, HCPs should lead with a person-centered approach to decision-making. By documenting relevant clinical information in a way that minimizes risks, genetics HCPs can balance thorough care with safeguarding patient privacy and autonomy.</p><p>Regulatory guidelines, such as from the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) (Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Title 42, § 493.1241, <span>2024</span>) and the College of American Pathologists (CAP) (Laboratory General Checklist. GEN.40750, <span>2020</span>), as well as technical standards from the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (Technical Standards for Clinical Genomics Laboratories, <span>2021</span>) require sex information on test requisitions but do not specify sex assigned at birth versus legal sex. Neither CLIA nor CAP mandates including this information in reports for most tests (Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Title 42, § 493.1291, <span>2024</span>; Laboratory General Checklist. GEN.41096, <span>2020</span>). For billing purposes, laboratories may request the sex listed on insurance.</p><p>Privacy concerns conflict with presumed clinical utility in the practice of “sex-checks” during genetic testing (Dusic et al., <span>2024</span>). Laboratories often perform quality control-based chromosomal checks against listed sex to detect sample swapping, a practice fraught with limitations. Since “sex-checks” only rule out swapping with someone of a different presumed sex chromosome composition, they are only about 50% effective at swapping detection (most individuals have either XX or XY chromosomes). In samples from intersex or TGD individuals, where chromosomal patterns may not align with binary expectations or requisition-indicated sex, “sex-checks” can reveal information that patients may not want to disclose or may not even know. Other issues with sex-checks and potential alternative quality control measures are further examined in Dusic et al., (<span>2024</span>).</p><p>Genetics lab reports frequently include sex and/or gender markers in the report, including sex chromosome composition – even when unrelated to the test performed. As discussed above, interoperability features make this information available across different healthcare systems, and GINA does not adequately protect this information. Sex chromosome data are particularly vulnerable to misuse in states where laws define sex based on genetic characteristics. For example, recent legislation in Montana (SB 458: Define Sex in Montana Law, <span>2023</span>) defines sex strictly based on chromosomes, gametes, and genitalia present at birth, and echo 2018 Trump administration efforts to define sex in an inappropriately binary fashion based on external genitalia and genetic testing (Jamal et al., <span>2024</span>). Under such laws, discrepancies between an individual's sex chromosomes, legal sex, and gender identity could place them at risk for legal scrutiny. Further, once this information is entered into interoperable EMRs, it can be readily accessed by outside HCPs. TGD patients may not have disclosed TGD status to their HCP(s) or to family members needing reports for cascade testing. Including this data in reports could lead to care discrimination and/or familial rejection.</p><p>Finally, “sex-checks” create risks even when this data are not included in the results report. The absence of federal legal protections means genetics labs could be required to disclose sex chromosome data without patient consent. Furthermore, the growing practice of secondary data usage adds an additional layer of concern in both clinical and direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic test settings (Hendricks-Sturrup & Lu, <span>2019</span>; Mladucky et al., <span>2021</span>). Cases like the “Golden State Killer” identification from DTC databases highlight the potential for genetic data to be used for purposes far beyond the original intent, such as by law enforcement (Guerrini et al., <span>2018</span>). In 2023, a 23andMe data breach exposed genetic data of 6.9 million users—including targeted information on Chinese and Jewish individuals—underscoring the susceptibility of sensitive data to outside attack (Alder, <span>2024</span>), a vulnerability also existing in EMRs (Lemberg, <span>2017</span>). In today's anti-LGBTQ+ climate, additional security measures are an imperative for SOGI and sex chromosome data.</p><p>Protecting the privacy of LGBTQ+ patients is a moral imperative to uphold the principle of “do no harm.” Institutions must act now to ensure that sensitive data is used solely for patient benefit and shielded from misuse in a landscape that increasingly targets LGBTQ+ communities.</p><p>Kimberly Zayhowski: Conceptualization; writing – original draft; writing – review and editing; supervision. Sarah Roth: Conceptualization; writing – review and editing. M. J. Westerfield: Conceptualization; writing – review and editing. Makenna A. Martin: Conceptualization; writing – review and editing. Kai Blumen: Conceptualization; writing – review and editing. Harris T. Bland: Conceptualization; writing – review and editing. Shelly W. McQuaid: Writing – review and editing. Kathleen F. Mittendorf: Conceptualization; writing – original draft; writing – review and editing; supervision.</p><p>KFM's spouse is the owner and operator of Lavender Spectrum Health, a private primary care health organization that predominantly serves the TGD population of the Portland-Vancouver Metro Area (Vancouver, WA, USA), where KFM also provides consultation. KFM reports unrelated institutional salary support from GE Healthcare. KZ has served as a paid consultant for Myriad Genetics, providing expertise on gender inclusivity. The rest of the authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose.</p>","PeriodicalId":54829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Genetic Counseling","volume":"34 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/jgc4.70008","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Genetic Counseling","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jgc4.70008","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"GENETICS & HEREDITY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Recent federal efforts, such as those by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, have expanded sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) data collection to improve healthcare equity, and several states mandate regular SOGI data collection in healthcare (examples in Hunter, 2021; Oregon Health Authority, 2023; Tsai, 2023). Best practice recommendations in genetics healthcare also encourage SOGI data collection (Bland et al., 2024; Jamal et al., 2024). SOGI data allow the provision of accurate, culturally responsive genetics care. For example, healthcare professionals' (HCP) knowledge of patients' gender-affirming care facilitates accurate cancer risk assessments and management (Cortina et al., 2024; Roth et al., 2024; von Vaupel-Klein & Walsh, 2021). Moreover, HCPs respecting patients' identities and family structures promotes trust and psychological safety (Call et al., 2021; Huser et al., 2022; McCann & Brown, 2018; Roth et al., 2024).
However, as we enter the second Trump administration, SOGI data documentation has concerning implications in the United States socio-political landscape. The previous Trump administration enacted overtly anti-LGBTQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, etc.) policies, including banning transgender and gender diverse (TGD) individuals from military service, attempting to define gender strictly based on sex assigned at birth, and rolling back LGBTQ+ patient protections granted during the Obama administration (Green et al., 2018; Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017; Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of Authority, 45 CFR 92, 2020). Despite re-expansion of LBGTQ+ federal legislative protections under the Biden administration, far-right anti-LGBTQ+ legislation has increased at the state level (American Civil Liberties Union, 2024; Restar et al., 2024). The 2024 Trump campaign and those of allied Congressional candidates promised additional anti-TGD policies, with Republicans spending over $222 million dollars on anti-TGD and anti-LGBTQ advertisements during this time (Simmons-Duffin, 2024). The Trump administration is expected to prioritize policies targeting TGD individuals early in its tenure, as highlighted in its “Agenda 47” platform, with points including cutting funding to schools teaching “radical gender ideology” and barring “men from women's spaces” (Trump, n.d.). He was recently quoted saying, “It will be the policy of the United States that there are only two genders, male and female” (Monteil, 2024). An upcoming Supreme Court decision (United States v. Skrmetti, Docket No. 23–477, 2024–2025) will decide whether state legislation banning gender-affirming care for minors is legal. This climate exacerbates realistic patient fears that SOGI information could be used for harm (Thompson, 2016). For example, amidst an anti-LGBTQ+ state government in 2023, Vanderbilt University Medical Center (VUMC) released the full medical records of TGD patients to the Tennessee Attorney General during a fraud investigation prompted by right-wing commentary that VUMC billed Medicaid for transgender healthcare (Bacallao, 2024; Senate Finance Committee – Majority Staff, 2024). This incident stoked TGD mistrust and demonstrated the potential for SOGI data weaponization (Kohli, 2023; Lemberg, 2017).
This author team comprises experts – most LGBTQ+ – in genetics healthcare and research who have advocated for inclusive SOGI data collection and usage practices in genetics. However, in the authors' collective experience, TGD patients are increasingly restricting identity disclosure and requesting “off-the-record” disclosure due to fear of the socio-political climate. This commentary explores the ethical implications of SOGI data documentation within genetics in the politically charged atmosphere of the United States.
The Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) restricts unauthorized disclosure of patient data but has limitations in safeguarding SOGI data (Clayton et al., 2024). While the US Department of Health and Human Services previously issued guidance that gender-affirming care should be subjected to additional protections for explicit patient consent prior to release, except in limited circumstances (US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 2021, 2022), it was vacated by a Texas District Court decision (State of Texas v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al. Document 74, 1183, 2022). Further, this guidance did not cover SOGI data collected as part of demographics. Without these protections, healthcare institutions may be compelled to release SOGI data—including gender-affirming care data—to government agencies without patient consent. The VUMC case highlights HIPAA limitations, revealing that healthcare institutions may feel obligated to comply with non-subpoena, privacy-compromising government requests.
The lack of robust SOGI data protections in the face of rising political pressures underscores the urgent need for stronger privacy safeguarding of SOGI data from government-directed scrutiny. While the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) (2008) narrowly protects individuals against health insurance and employment discrimination, it does not protect individuals from having their genetic information used in other ways, such as in law enforcement or government investigations. Some states have more robust genetic protections than the federal provisions of GINA, but these vary widely and it is unclear whether they would protect from inquiries by federal entities (Suter, 2020).
Further, genetic data collected as part of research is not always adequately cared for or protected. Some genetic data, such as sex chromosome composition, polygenic scores, and whole exome sequencing, could be used to query genetic origins of gender identity and sexual orientation in harmful ways and is especially vulnerable to misuse in secondary research datasets (Hamer et al., 2021; Holm & Ploug, 2019; Kraft & Mittendorf, 2024; Maxmen, 2019; Meyer et al., 2023; Rajkovic et al., 2022; Richardson et al., 2019; Sabatello et al., 2022). As others have highlighted, sociobehavioral genomics research is often conducted without appropriate consideration of confounding social variables that may otherwise explain apparent data linkages (Meyer et al., 2023); such research can be used to enact harms against LGBTQ+ and other marginalized communities (Hamer et al., 2021; Holm & Ploug, 2019; Maxmen, 2019; Panofsky et al., 2021; Rajkovic et al., 2022; Richardson et al., 2019). LGBTQ+ individuals have emphasized the need for stringent protections and ethical guidelines (Hammack-Aviran et al., 2022; Rajkovic et al., 2022).
Genetic counseling research data are at particular risk for inquiries by law enforcement as much of this research is not funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), meaning that Certificates of Confidentiality – the most robust protection of data – are not automatically granted (Clayton et al., 2024). Even NIH-funded research poses risks; the new NIH data sharing policy, which requires that researchers share data broadly with the public, offers little specific guidance on how to protect individual-level data from re-identification and little data governance guidance for secondary uses of such data (Kraft & Mittendorf, 2024; National Institutes of Health (NIH), 2020; Sabatello et al., 2022; Xia et al., 2023).
The 21st Century Cures Act (2016) directs greater EMR interoperability to facilitate seamless transfer of patient information across healthcare networks and improve care continuity. However, indiscriminate data exchange poses privacy risks. Data exchange-related privacy risks are a known phenomenon recognized by the informatics community as the “interoperability trap” (Arvisais-Anhalt et al., 2023; Zubrzycki, 2022). Once SOGI data are documented in a patient's EMR, it may be accessed by any HCP with an interoperable system (e.g., through Epic's Care Everywhere feature) without the patient's explicit understanding/consent.
SOGI-related data exchange to a health system in a state with anti-LGBTQ+ legislation could expose patients to legal scrutiny. Imagine a scenario where a TGD patient from a TGD-care restrictive state seeks gender-affirming care in another state. Not unlike risks for patients seeking out-of-state abortion and clinicians who provide them, shared EMR systems pose risks to patients receiving and clinicians providing gender-affirming care in legal states, potentially leading to interstate prosecution. Already, states are attempting to restrict out-of-state care for TGD minors; for example, Texas is attempting to investigate families seeking such care under the Texas provision of child abuse, though these investigations are presently blocked by the courts (Abbott v. Doe, No. 03-22-00126-CV, 2024 WL 1286316, 2024; Opinion No. KP-0401, 2022; Tucker & Riess, 2024).
Expanded interoperability related to 21st Century Cures raises privacy concerns that specifically impact LGBTQ+ adolescents, whose confidentiality and access to gender-affirming care are largely dictated by state laws (Arvisais-Anhalt et al., 2023; Sharko et al., 2022; Zubrzycki, 2022). Parents or guardians often have access to their child's EMR – either by default or through adolescent decision for parental/guardian proxy – revealing SOGI-related data, including demographics documentation of gender identity and sexual orientation, as well as reproductive and gender-affirming care. For instance, in states where the age of medical consent is under 18 or in states where the consent of only one parent is required for the provision of such care, access to the medical record by an unsupportive parent could endanger the child's well-being (Campbell, n.d.; Oregon Health Authority, 2019).
Detailed pedigrees are essential for accurate genetic risk assessment, but pedigree documentation of TGD status creates precarity. The National Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC) recently updated its guideline to a “gender-first” pedigree approach, prioritizing gender over sex assigned at birth (Bennett et al., 2022). While this is a meaningful step toward inclusivity, this guideline recommends capturing sex assigned at birth—thus clearly recording TGD status.
Recent literature recommends documenting TGD family members in pedigrees (Barnes et al., 2020). While we recognize the importance of honoring family members' gender identities and ensuring an accurate assessment, recording this information in medical records must be approached with caution. TGD status documentation is potentially conducted without the family member's consent and could inadvertently place them at risk. Genetics HCPs must therefore balance providing inclusive, comprehensive clinical care with privacy protection responsibilities.
We assert that genetics HCPs, such as genetic counselors and geneticists, should have transparent conversations about privacy and documentation of SOGI status, followed by discussions about how organ systems, hormonal milieu, and surgical history affect care recommendations. Additional demographic factors relevant to genetic counseling, such as country of origin, may warrant similar privacy conversations (Callaghan et al., 2019; Saadi et al., 2020). Others have provided guidance for more inclusive clinical care (e.g., taking organ inventories for all cancer genetics patients to ensure anatomy- and history-based care), benefiting everyone without singling out LGBTQ+ individuals (Berro & Zayhowski, 2023; Bland et al., 2024; Kronk et al., 2022; Motiff et al., 2024; Pratt-Chapman et al., 2024; Ruderman et al., 2021; Schmidt & Rizzolo, 2017; von Vaupel-Klein & Walsh, 2021). Genetics HCPs should prioritize patient autonomy in documentation decisions (e.g., pedigree symbol choices, pronouns, partner(s) inclusion) while still providing comprehensive care recommendations (e.g., genetic risk assessment, screening/management recommendations) to the patient. Where these two may conflict, HCPs should lead with a person-centered approach to decision-making. By documenting relevant clinical information in a way that minimizes risks, genetics HCPs can balance thorough care with safeguarding patient privacy and autonomy.
Regulatory guidelines, such as from the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) (Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Title 42, § 493.1241, 2024) and the College of American Pathologists (CAP) (Laboratory General Checklist. GEN.40750, 2020), as well as technical standards from the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (Technical Standards for Clinical Genomics Laboratories, 2021) require sex information on test requisitions but do not specify sex assigned at birth versus legal sex. Neither CLIA nor CAP mandates including this information in reports for most tests (Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Title 42, § 493.1291, 2024; Laboratory General Checklist. GEN.41096, 2020). For billing purposes, laboratories may request the sex listed on insurance.
Privacy concerns conflict with presumed clinical utility in the practice of “sex-checks” during genetic testing (Dusic et al., 2024). Laboratories often perform quality control-based chromosomal checks against listed sex to detect sample swapping, a practice fraught with limitations. Since “sex-checks” only rule out swapping with someone of a different presumed sex chromosome composition, they are only about 50% effective at swapping detection (most individuals have either XX or XY chromosomes). In samples from intersex or TGD individuals, where chromosomal patterns may not align with binary expectations or requisition-indicated sex, “sex-checks” can reveal information that patients may not want to disclose or may not even know. Other issues with sex-checks and potential alternative quality control measures are further examined in Dusic et al., (2024).
Genetics lab reports frequently include sex and/or gender markers in the report, including sex chromosome composition – even when unrelated to the test performed. As discussed above, interoperability features make this information available across different healthcare systems, and GINA does not adequately protect this information. Sex chromosome data are particularly vulnerable to misuse in states where laws define sex based on genetic characteristics. For example, recent legislation in Montana (SB 458: Define Sex in Montana Law, 2023) defines sex strictly based on chromosomes, gametes, and genitalia present at birth, and echo 2018 Trump administration efforts to define sex in an inappropriately binary fashion based on external genitalia and genetic testing (Jamal et al., 2024). Under such laws, discrepancies between an individual's sex chromosomes, legal sex, and gender identity could place them at risk for legal scrutiny. Further, once this information is entered into interoperable EMRs, it can be readily accessed by outside HCPs. TGD patients may not have disclosed TGD status to their HCP(s) or to family members needing reports for cascade testing. Including this data in reports could lead to care discrimination and/or familial rejection.
Finally, “sex-checks” create risks even when this data are not included in the results report. The absence of federal legal protections means genetics labs could be required to disclose sex chromosome data without patient consent. Furthermore, the growing practice of secondary data usage adds an additional layer of concern in both clinical and direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic test settings (Hendricks-Sturrup & Lu, 2019; Mladucky et al., 2021). Cases like the “Golden State Killer” identification from DTC databases highlight the potential for genetic data to be used for purposes far beyond the original intent, such as by law enforcement (Guerrini et al., 2018). In 2023, a 23andMe data breach exposed genetic data of 6.9 million users—including targeted information on Chinese and Jewish individuals—underscoring the susceptibility of sensitive data to outside attack (Alder, 2024), a vulnerability also existing in EMRs (Lemberg, 2017). In today's anti-LGBTQ+ climate, additional security measures are an imperative for SOGI and sex chromosome data.
Protecting the privacy of LGBTQ+ patients is a moral imperative to uphold the principle of “do no harm.” Institutions must act now to ensure that sensitive data is used solely for patient benefit and shielded from misuse in a landscape that increasingly targets LGBTQ+ communities.
Kimberly Zayhowski: Conceptualization; writing – original draft; writing – review and editing; supervision. Sarah Roth: Conceptualization; writing – review and editing. M. J. Westerfield: Conceptualization; writing – review and editing. Makenna A. Martin: Conceptualization; writing – review and editing. Kai Blumen: Conceptualization; writing – review and editing. Harris T. Bland: Conceptualization; writing – review and editing. Shelly W. McQuaid: Writing – review and editing. Kathleen F. Mittendorf: Conceptualization; writing – original draft; writing – review and editing; supervision.
KFM's spouse is the owner and operator of Lavender Spectrum Health, a private primary care health organization that predominantly serves the TGD population of the Portland-Vancouver Metro Area (Vancouver, WA, USA), where KFM also provides consultation. KFM reports unrelated institutional salary support from GE Healthcare. KZ has served as a paid consultant for Myriad Genetics, providing expertise on gender inclusivity. The rest of the authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose.
最近联邦政府的努力,如医疗保险中心的努力;医疗补助服务扩大了性取向和性别认同(SOGI)数据收集,以改善医疗保健公平性,一些州要求在医疗保健领域定期收集SOGI数据(例如,Hunter, 2021;俄勒冈州卫生局,2023年;蔡,2023)。遗传学医疗保健的最佳实践建议也鼓励SOGI数据收集(Bland等人,2024;贾马尔等人,2024)。SOGI数据允许提供准确的、符合文化的遗传学护理。例如,医疗保健专业人员(HCP)对患者性别确认护理的了解有助于准确的癌症风险评估和管理(Cortina等人,2024;Roth等人,2024;von Vaupel-Klein &;沃尔什,2021)。此外,医护人员尊重患者的身份和家庭结构促进信任和心理安全(Call等,2021;Huser等人,2022;麦肯,布朗,2018;Roth et al., 2024)。然而,随着我们进入第二个特朗普政府,SOGI数据文件对美国社会政治格局产生了影响。上一届特朗普政府颁布了公开反对LGBTQ+(女同性恋、男同性恋、双性恋、跨性别者、酷儿/质疑者等)的政策,包括禁止跨性别者和性别多样化者(TGD)服兵役,试图严格根据出生时的性别来定义性别,并取消奥巴马政府期间给予LGBTQ+患者的保护(Green等人,2018;跨性别者服兵役备忘录,2017年;健康和健康教育项目或活动中的非歧视,授权,45 CFR 92, 2020)。尽管拜登政府重新扩大了对lgbtq +的联邦立法保护,但极右翼的反lgbtq +立法在州一级有所增加(美国公民自由联盟,2024;Restar et al., 2024)。2024年特朗普竞选及其盟友国会候选人承诺采取额外的反tgd政策,共和党在此期间花费了超过2.22亿美元用于反tgd和反lgbtq广告(Simmons-Duffin, 2024)。特朗普政府预计将在其任期初期优先考虑针对TGD个人的政策,正如其“47号议程”平台所强调的那样,其中包括削减对教授“激进性别意识形态”的学校的资助,以及禁止“男性进入女性空间”(特朗普,无日期)。他最近被引述说,“美国的政策将是只有两种性别,男性和女性”(Monteil, 2024)。最高法院即将做出的一项裁决(美国诉斯克梅蒂案,诉讼摘要第23-477号,2024-2025)将决定各州立法禁止对未成年人进行性别确认护理是否合法。这种氛围加剧了患者对SOGI信息可能被用于伤害的现实恐惧(Thompson, 2016)。例如,在2023年反对lgbtq +的州政府中,范德比尔特大学医学中心(VUMC)在一项欺诈调查中向田纳西州总检察长公布了TGD患者的全部医疗记录,该调查是由右翼评论引发的,该评论称VUMC为跨性别医疗保健收取了医疗补助费用(Bacallao, 2024;参议院财政委员会-多数工作人员,2024年)。这一事件激起了TGD的不信任,并展示了SOGI数据武器化的潜力(Kohli, 2023;Lemberg, 2017)。本作者团队由遗传学医疗保健和研究领域的专家(大多数为LGBTQ+)组成,他们主张在遗传学中进行包容性的SOGI数据收集和使用实践。然而,根据作者的集体经验,由于对社会政治气候的恐惧,TGD患者越来越限制身份披露,并要求“非记录”披露。这篇评论探讨了在美国充满政治气氛的遗传学中SOGI数据文件的伦理含义。《健康保险流通与责任法案》(HIPAA)的隐私规则限制未经授权披露患者数据,但在保护SOGI数据方面存在局限性(Clayton et al., 2024)。虽然美国卫生与公众服务部此前发布了指导意见,规定性别确认护理应受到额外的保护,除非在有限的情况下(美国卫生与公众服务部(HHS), 2021年,2022年),但德克萨斯州地方法院的一项裁决(德克萨斯州诉平等就业机会委员会等)取消了这一规定。文件74、1183、2022)。此外,本指南不包括作为人口统计数据一部分收集的SOGI数据。如果没有这些保护措施,医疗机构可能会被迫在未经患者同意的情况下向政府机构公布SOGI数据,包括性别确认护理数据。VUMC案例突出了HIPAA的局限性,揭示了医疗机构可能觉得有义务遵守非传票、损害隐私的政府请求。 面对不断上升的政治压力,SOGI数据缺乏强有力的保护,这突显出迫切需要加强对SOGI数据的隐私保护,使其免受政府指导的审查。虽然《基因信息非歧视法案》(GINA)(2008年)仅保护个人免受健康保险和就业歧视,但它并没有保护个人的基因信息不被用于其他方面,如执法或政府调查。一些州的基因保护比联邦政府的GINA规定更有力,但这些规定差异很大,目前尚不清楚它们是否能免受联邦实体的调查(Suter, 2020)。此外,作为研究的一部分收集的遗传数据并不总是得到充分的照顾或保护。一些遗传数据,如性染色体组成、多基因评分和全外显子组测序,可能以有害的方式用于查询性别认同和性取向的遗传起源,尤其容易在二手研究数据集中被滥用(Hamer等人,2021;河中沙洲,Ploug, 2019;卡夫,曼蒂,2024;Maxmen, 2019;Meyer et al., 2023;Rajkovic et al., 2022;Richardson等人,2019;Sabatello et al., 2022)。正如其他人所强调的,社会行为基因组学研究通常没有适当考虑混淆的社会变量,否则可能解释明显的数据联系(Meyer等人,2023);这样的研究可以用来制定对LGBTQ+和其他边缘化群体的伤害(Hamer et al., 2021;河中沙洲,Ploug, 2019;Maxmen, 2019;Panofsky et al., 2021;Rajkovic et al., 2022;Richardson et al., 2019)。LGBTQ+个人强调了严格保护和道德准则的必要性(Hammack-Aviran等人,2022;Rajkovic et al., 2022)。遗传咨询研究数据特别容易受到执法部门的调查,因为这类研究的大部分不是由美国国立卫生研究院(NIH)资助的,这意味着保密证书——最有力的数据保护——不会自动授予(Clayton et al., 2024)。即使是美国国立卫生研究院资助的研究也存在风险;新的NIH数据共享政策要求研究人员与公众广泛共享数据,但对于如何保护个人层面的数据不被重新识别,以及对此类数据的二次使用,几乎没有提供具体的指导。曼蒂,2024;国立卫生研究院(NIH), 2020;Sabatello et al., 2022;夏等人,2023)。《21世纪治愈法案》(2016年)要求提高电子病历的互操作性,以促进患者信息在医疗保健网络之间的无缝传输,并提高护理的连续性。然而,不加区分的数据交换会带来隐私风险。数据交换相关的隐私风险是信息学界公认的“互操作性陷阱”(Arvisais-Anhalt et al., 2023;Zubrzycki, 2022)。一旦SOGI数据被记录在患者的电子病历中,任何具有互操作系统的HCP都可以在没有患者明确理解/同意的情况下访问它(例如,通过Epic的Care Everywhere功能)。在一个有反lgbtq +立法的州,与sogi相关的数据交换可能会使患者受到法律审查。想象一下这样一个场景:来自TGD护理限制州的TGD患者在另一个州寻求性别确认护理。与寻求州外堕胎的患者和提供堕胎服务的临床医生面临的风险不同,共享电子病历系统对在合法州接受性别确认护理的患者和提供性别确认护理的临床医生构成风险,可能导致州际起诉。一些州已经在试图限制州外对被拘留未成年人的照顾;例如,德克萨斯州正试图调查根据德克萨斯州虐待儿童条款寻求此类照顾的家庭,尽管这些调查目前被法院阻止(Abbott v. Doe, No. 03-22-00126-CV, 2024 WL 1286316, 2024;意见没有。kp - 0401, 2022;塔克,里斯,2024)。与21世纪治愈相关的扩展互操作性引发了隐私问题,特别是对LGBTQ+青少年的影响,他们的保密和获得性别确认护理的机会在很大程度上是由州法律规定的(Arvisais-Anhalt等人,2023;Sharko et al., 2022;Zubrzycki, 2022)。父母或监护人通常可以访问他们孩子的电子病历——要么是默认的,要么是通过父母/监护人代理的青少年决定——披露与sogi相关的数据,包括性别认同和性取向的人口统计记录,以及生殖和性别确认护理。例如,在医疗同意年龄低于18岁的州,或在提供这种护理只需要父母一方同意的州,不支持的父母获得医疗记录可能会危及儿童的福祉(Campbell, n.d;俄勒冈州卫生局,2019)。 详细的家谱对准确的遗传风险评估至关重要,但TGD状态的家谱记录会产生不稳定性。美国国家遗传咨询师协会(NSGC)最近更新了其指导方针,采用“性别优先”的谱系方法,优先考虑性别而不是出生时的生理性别(Bennett et al., 2022)。虽然这是朝着包容性迈出的有意义的一步,但该指南建议记录出生时的性别分配,从而清楚地记录TGD状态。最近的文献建议在系谱中记录TGD家族成员(Barnes et al., 2020)。虽然我们认识到尊重家庭成员性别认同和确保准确评估的重要性,但在医疗记录中记录这一信息必须谨慎处理。TGD状态文件可能在未经家庭成员同意的情况下进行,并可能在无意中使他们处于危险之中。因此,遗传学HCPs必须在提供包容、全面的临床护理与隐私保护责任之间取得平衡。我们认为,遗传学HCPs,如遗传咨询师和遗传学家,应该对SOGI状态的隐私和文件进行透明的对话,然后讨论器官系统、激素环境和手术史如何影响护理建议。与遗传咨询相关的其他人口统计因素,如原籍国,可能需要进行类似的隐私对话(Callaghan等人,2019;Saadi等人,2020)。其他人则为更具包容性的临床护理提供指导(例如,为所有癌症遗传学患者进行器官清单,以确保基于解剖学和病史的护理),使每个人都受益,而不是单独针对LGBTQ+个体(Berro &;Zayhowski, 2023;Bland et al., 2024;Kronk等人,2022;Motiff等人,2024;Pratt-Chapman et al., 2024;Ruderman et al., 2021;施密特和Rizzolo, 2017;von Vaupel-Klein &;沃尔什,2021)。遗传学HCPs应优先考虑患者在文件决策方面的自主权(例如,谱系符号选择,代词,伴侣纳入),同时仍然向患者提供全面的护理建议(例如,遗传风险评估,筛查/管理建议)。在这两者可能发生冲突的地方,医务人员应该以人为本的方法进行决策。通过以最小化风险的方式记录相关临床信息,遗传学HCPs可以在彻底护理与保护患者隐私和自主权之间取得平衡。监管指南,如临床实验室改进修正案(CLIA)(1988年临床实验室改进修正案,标题42,§493.1241,2024)和美国病理学家学会(CAP)(实验室总清单)。GEN.40750, 2020),以及美国医学遗传学和基因组学学院的技术标准(临床基因组学实验室技术标准,2021)要求在测试申请表上提供性别信息,但没有指定出生时的性别与法定性别。CLIA和CAP都没有要求在大多数检测报告中包括这些信息(1988年临床实验室改进修正案,标题42,§493.1291,2024;实验室一般检查表。GEN.41096, 2020)。出于计费目的,实验室可能会要求提供保险上列出的性别。隐私问题与基因检测期间“性别检查”实践中假定的临床效用相冲突(Dusic et al., 2024)。实验室经常对所列性别进行基于质量控制的染色体检查,以检测样本交换,这种做法充满了局限性。由于“性别检查”只排除与另一个人交换不同的假定性染色体组成,它们在交换检测上只有大约50%的有效性(大多数人要么有XX染色体,要么有XY染色体)。在双性人或TGD个体的样本中,染色体模式可能与二元期望或请求指示的性别不一致,“性别检查”可以揭示患者可能不想透露或甚至不知道的信息。Dusic等人(2024)进一步研究了性别检查和潜在替代质量控制措施的其他问题。遗传学实验室报告经常包括报告中的性别和/或性别标记,包括性染色体组成-即使与所进行的测试无关。如上所述,互操作性特性使这些信息可以跨不同的医疗保健系统使用,而GINA不能充分保护这些信息。在法律根据基因特征定义性别的州,性染色体数据特别容易被滥用。例如,蒙大拿州最近的立法(SB 458: 2023年蒙大拿州性别定义法)严格根据出生时存在的染色体、配子和生殖器定义性别,并呼应了2018年特朗普政府基于外部生殖器和基因检测以不恰当的二元方式定义性别的努力(Jamal等人,2024年)。 在这样的法律下,个人的性染色体、法定性别和性别认同之间的差异可能会使他们面临法律审查的风险。此外,一旦这些信息被输入到可互操作的电子病历中,外部hcp就可以很容易地访问它。TGD患者可能没有向他们的HCP或需要报告级联检测的家庭成员透露TGD状况。在报告中包含这些数据可能导致护理歧视和/或家庭排斥。最后,即使在结果报告中没有包含这些数据,“性别检查”也会产生风险。由于缺乏联邦法律保护,基因实验室可能会在未经患者同意的情况下披露性染色体数据。此外,在临床和直接面向消费者(DTC)的基因检测设置中,越来越多的二次数据使用实践增加了额外的关注层面。陆,2019;Mladucky et al., 2021)。来自DTC数据库的“金州杀手”身份识别等案例突显了基因数据被用于远远超出初衷的目的的潜力,例如执法(Guerrini et al., 2018)。2023年,23andMe数据泄露暴露了690万用户的基因数据,其中包括针对中国人和犹太人的针对性信息,这突显了敏感数据对外部攻击的敏感性(Alder, 2024),这一漏洞也存在于电子病历中(Lemberg, 2017)。在当今反lgbtq +的氛围下,额外的安全措施是SOGI和性染色体数据的必要条件。保护LGBTQ+患者的隐私是维护“不伤害”原则的道德要求。机构必须立即采取行动,确保敏感数据仅用于患者利益,并在越来越多地针对LGBTQ+社区的情况下避免滥用。Kimberly Zayhowski:概念化;写作——原稿;写作——审阅和编辑;监督。莎拉·罗斯:概念化;写作——审阅和编辑。M. J. Westerfield:概念化;写作——审阅和编辑。Makenna A. Martin:概念化;写作——审阅和编辑。Kai Blumen:概念化;写作——审阅和编辑。Harris T. Bland:概念化;写作——审阅和编辑。谢利·w·麦奎德:写作-评论和编辑。Kathleen F. Mittendorf:概念化;写作——原稿;写作——审阅和编辑;监督。KFM的配偶是Lavender Spectrum Health的所有者和经营者,这是一家私人初级保健卫生组织,主要服务于波特兰-温哥华都会区(Vancouver, WA, USA)的TGD人群,KFM也在那里提供咨询服务。KFM报告了GE医疗集团提供的不相关的机构薪酬支持。KZ曾担任Myriad Genetics的有偿顾问,提供性别包容性方面的专业知识。其他作者没有需要披露的利益冲突。
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Genetic Counseling (JOGC), published for the National Society of Genetic Counselors, is a timely, international forum addressing all aspects of the discipline and practice of genetic counseling. The journal focuses on the critical questions and problems that arise at the interface between rapidly advancing technological developments and the concerns of individuals and communities at genetic risk. The publication provides genetic counselors, other clinicians and health educators, laboratory geneticists, bioethicists, legal scholars, social scientists, and other researchers with a premier resource on genetic counseling topics in national, international, and cross-national contexts.