Belen Chocobar, Peter Claeys, Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Macroeconomic theories attribute rigidities in expectations formation to two mechanisms: sticky or noisy information. Recent advances in testing time variations in forecast dispersion—using the fluctuation rationality test—allow detecting departures from forecaster rationality over time. Relating individual forecaster behavior to economic or political factors on a panel of budget balance forecasts from Consensus Economics, a large panel of individual expert forecasters in four major OECD countries between 1993 to 2023, we find evidence for forecaster behavior in line with noisy information. Traditional full-sample tests show that forecasters are not rational, but this is due to an overly pessimistic reaction to sudden big shifts, like the global financial crisis or the pandemic. In normal times, forecasters do systematically incorporate economic and political news in budget forecast revisions.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Forecasting is an international journal that publishes refereed papers on forecasting. It is multidisciplinary, welcoming papers dealing with any aspect of forecasting: theoretical, practical, computational and methodological. A broad interpretation of the topic is taken with approaches from various subject areas, such as statistics, economics, psychology, systems engineering and social sciences, all encouraged. Furthermore, the Journal welcomes a wide diversity of applications in such fields as business, government, technology and the environment. Of particular interest are papers dealing with modelling issues and the relationship of forecasting systems to decision-making processes.