QPoS: Decentralized Stake-Based Leader and Voter Selection in a PBFT System With Mobile Voters

IF 6.7 2区计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering Pub Date : 2024-11-27 DOI:10.1109/TNSE.2024.3507545

Jelena Mišić;Vojislav B. Mišić;Xiaolin Chang

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Both Proof of Stake (PoS) and Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus schemes for permissioned blockchains incur the risk of centralization of voting power in the hands of a small number of wealthy voters. In this work, we present Qualified Proof of Stake (QPoS) scheme which alleviates centralization by rewarding truthful behavior of both voters and leaders, and penalizing their untruthful behavior. Leaders are elected according to the current stake which gives preference to more trustworthy nodes. Nodes with low stake at the end of a round which consists of multiple PBFT voting cycles are excluded from voting in subsequent rounds, while nodes with sufficient stake may leave the network temporarily without losing their stake. We consider multiple node classes with different voting behavior and model them using embedded Markov Chain which corresponds to Semi Markov Process (SMP) in order to determine system performance. Our results show the interaction of class populations, voting behavior, and mobility with round size, and show notable stake-based prioritization among the nodes for selection of PBFT leaders. Moreover, we show that higher proportion of well behaved nodes and shorter voting rounds are needed to achieve consensus with high probability.

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许可区块链的权益证明（PoS）和委托权益证明（DPoS）共识方案都存在投票权集中在少数富有选民手中的风险。在这项工作中，我们提出了合格权益证明（QPoS）方案，该方案通过奖励投票人和领导者的真实行为、惩罚其不真实行为来缓解中心化问题。领导者是根据当前的赌注选举产生的，而当前的赌注会优先考虑更值得信赖的节点。在由多个 PBFT 投票周期组成的一轮投票结束时，股权较低的节点将被排除在后续投票之外，而有足够股权的节点可以暂时离开网络而不会失去其股权。我们考虑了具有不同投票行为的多个节点类别，并使用与半马尔可夫过程（SMP）相对应的嵌入式马尔可夫链为它们建模，以确定系统性能。我们的结果表明了类群、投票行为和流动性与回合规模的交互作用，并显示了在选择 PBFT 领导者时节点间基于股权的优先级排序。此外，我们还表明，要想高概率地达成共识，需要更多表现良好的节点和更短的投票回合。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering Engineering-Control and Systems Engineering

CiteScore

12.60

自引率

9.10%

发文量

393

期刊介绍： The proposed journal, called the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering (TNSE), is committed to timely publishing of peer-reviewed technical articles that deal with the theory and applications of network science and the interconnections among the elements in a system that form a network. In particular, the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering publishes articles on understanding, prediction, and control of structures and behaviors of networks at the fundamental level. The types of networks covered include physical or engineered networks, information networks, biological networks, semantic networks, economic networks, social networks, and ecological networks. Aimed at discovering common principles that govern network structures, network functionalities and behaviors of networks, the journal seeks articles on understanding, prediction, and control of structures and behaviors of networks. Another trans-disciplinary focus of the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering is the interactions between and co-evolution of different genres of networks.