Co-CEO Structure and Earnings Smoothing Incentives

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of a co-CEO structure on earnings smoothing and its implications for the informativeness of earnings. While the consequences of a co-CEO structure have been relatively underexplored in prior research, existing studies suggest potential benefits, such as higher valuations and stronger internal governance. This paper delves into the specific consequences of a co-CEO structure, focusing on earnings smoothing practices. Using data from Korean firms, where co-CEO structures are prevalent, we find that firms with a co-CEO structure exhibit smoother earnings compared to those with a sole-CEO structure. However, the informativeness of these smooth earnings is reduced under a co-CEO structure, suggesting that co-CEOs engage in earnings smoothing primarily for their own benefit, rather than to provide more information to investors. Additional analyses reveal that co-CEOs' earnings smoothing leads to adverse consequences for investors, including lower earnings quality, higher costs of capital, increased financial distress, greater credit risk, and higher stock price crash risk. Our study contributes to the literature by highlighting the potential costs associated with co-CEO structures, particularly in terms of reduced earnings informativeness.