Electoral Incentives and Negotiated Settlements: Legislative Deliberation on the Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines

IF 2.5 4区 经济学 Q2 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Aya Watanabe
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Some conflict-experiencing countries undergo both violent and electoral competitions. In other words, electoral competition evolves while nonstate actors struggle to realize their political and cultural demands by arms. Although increasing attention has been paid to the interplay between domestic political dynamics and violent conflict, we still know little about how the electoral calculations of legislators shape their response to negotiated settlement, possibly influencing conflict processes. By examining the congressional records of the House of Representatives in the Philippines, this study conducts quantitative text analyses to assess the impacts of electoral incentives—shaped by executive popularity, district ethnic composition, and the occurrence of conflict-related violence—on legislators' response to negotiated settlement. The results demonstrate that legislators are sensitive to constituents' views on conflict settlement by showing support or opposition to negotiated settlement, anticipating their electoral fortunes in the next election.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
9.10%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: The Developing Economies is the official journal of the Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, and publishes original research articles dealing with empirical and comparative studies on social sciences relating to the developing countries.
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