CEO political ideology and payout policy

IF 3.6 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Ali Bayat , Marc Goergen
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study investigates how CEO political ideology affects payout policy. Studying the CEOs of S&P 500 firms during 1997–2019 and measuring CEO political ideology by CEO political donations, we find that conservative CEOs are more likely to pay dividends and to make share repurchases, while also paying higher dividends. We find that conservative CEOs finance the higher dividends and share repurchases by utilizing the cash holdings and reducing capital and R&D expenditures. Nevertheless, CEO political ideology does not explain dividend cuts. This suggests that firms led by conservative CEOs exhibit levels of dividend flexibility comparable to those of firms led by other CEOs. Finally, we find that CEO conservatism has no effect on firm performance, firm value, R&D expenditure, and capital expenditure.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
5.40%
发文量
262
期刊介绍: The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.
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