Consumer data collection strategies in two-sided platforms: The role of data ownership assignment and privacy concerns

IF 9.8 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL
Xuan Xi , Yulin Zhang , Mark Goh
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Abstract

Recognizing data as the new oil of the digital economy, two-sided platforms have invested heavily in collecting consumer data. However, issues surround privacy concerns and conflicts over data ownership. More importantly, should consumers retain ownership of their personal data? This paper models a two-sided platform under different data ownership structures and explores the effect of data ownership assignment, consumer privacy concerns, and network externalities on Consumer Data Collection (CDC) strategies. Game theoretic results suggest that, with a low data collection compensation, leaving data ownership with consumers increases the platform's inclination toward investing in CDC strategies when the cost of personal data protection is low and the loss of consumer data ownership is high. However, in cases with high data collection compensation, this inclination diminishes, indicating a decreased desire for CDC investment. Interestingly, when data ownership is assigned to consumers, heightened consumer privacy concerns lead to consumers providing less personal data, but the platform may be more incentivized to invest in CDC. Further, allowing consumers to hold on to data does not always increase consumer surplus, as the latter depends on the trade-off between the costs of data ownership shift (i.e., both personal data protection costs and data collection compensation) and the benefits attached to the data. When data collection compensation is relatively low, conflicting views on data ownership may arise between the platform and consumers.
双边平台中的消费者数据收集策略:数据所有权分配和隐私问题的作用
双边平台认识到数据是数字经济的新石油,在收集消费者数据方面投入了大量资金。然而,问题围绕着隐私问题和数据所有权的冲突。更重要的是,消费者是否应该保留其个人数据的所有权?本文建立了不同数据所有权结构下的双边平台模型,探讨了数据所有权分配、消费者隐私问题和网络外部性对消费者数据收集策略的影响。博弈论结果表明,在数据收集补偿较低的情况下,当个人数据保护成本较低而消费者数据所有权损失较高时,将数据所有权留给消费者会增加平台投资CDC策略的倾向。然而,在数据收集补偿较高的情况下,这种倾向减弱,表明对CDC投资的愿望减少。有趣的是,当数据所有权分配给消费者时,消费者对隐私的担忧加剧,导致消费者提供的个人数据减少,但平台可能更有动力投资CDC。此外,允许消费者持有数据并不总是会增加消费者剩余,因为后者取决于数据所有权转移的成本(即个人数据保护成本和数据收集补偿)与数据附带的利益之间的权衡。当数据收集补偿较低时,平台和消费者之间可能会对数据所有权产生冲突。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
International Journal of Production Economics
International Journal of Production Economics 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
21.40
自引率
7.50%
发文量
266
审稿时长
52 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.
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