{"title":"Consumer data collection strategies in two-sided platforms: The role of data ownership assignment and privacy concerns","authors":"Xuan Xi , Yulin Zhang , Mark Goh","doi":"10.1016/j.ijpe.2024.109435","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recognizing data as the new oil of the digital economy, two-sided platforms have invested heavily in collecting consumer data. However, issues surround privacy concerns and conflicts over data ownership. More importantly, should consumers retain ownership of their personal data? This paper models a two-sided platform under different data ownership structures and explores the effect of data ownership assignment, consumer privacy concerns, and network externalities on Consumer Data Collection (CDC) strategies. Game theoretic results suggest that, with a low data collection compensation, leaving data ownership with consumers increases the platform's inclination toward investing in CDC strategies when the cost of personal data protection is low and the loss of consumer data ownership is high. However, in cases with high data collection compensation, this inclination diminishes, indicating a decreased desire for CDC investment. Interestingly, when data ownership is assigned to consumers, heightened consumer privacy concerns lead to consumers providing less personal data, but the platform may be more incentivized to invest in CDC. Further, allowing consumers to hold on to data does not always increase consumer surplus, as the latter depends on the trade-off between the costs of data ownership shift (i.e., both personal data protection costs and data collection compensation) and the benefits attached to the data. When data collection compensation is relatively low, conflicting views on data ownership may arise between the platform and consumers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":14287,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Production Economics","volume":"280 ","pages":"Article 109435"},"PeriodicalIF":9.8000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Production Economics","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925527324002925","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Recognizing data as the new oil of the digital economy, two-sided platforms have invested heavily in collecting consumer data. However, issues surround privacy concerns and conflicts over data ownership. More importantly, should consumers retain ownership of their personal data? This paper models a two-sided platform under different data ownership structures and explores the effect of data ownership assignment, consumer privacy concerns, and network externalities on Consumer Data Collection (CDC) strategies. Game theoretic results suggest that, with a low data collection compensation, leaving data ownership with consumers increases the platform's inclination toward investing in CDC strategies when the cost of personal data protection is low and the loss of consumer data ownership is high. However, in cases with high data collection compensation, this inclination diminishes, indicating a decreased desire for CDC investment. Interestingly, when data ownership is assigned to consumers, heightened consumer privacy concerns lead to consumers providing less personal data, but the platform may be more incentivized to invest in CDC. Further, allowing consumers to hold on to data does not always increase consumer surplus, as the latter depends on the trade-off between the costs of data ownership shift (i.e., both personal data protection costs and data collection compensation) and the benefits attached to the data. When data collection compensation is relatively low, conflicting views on data ownership may arise between the platform and consumers.
期刊介绍:
The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.