Promoting carbon neutrality through ultra-low energy buildings in China: Evidence from evolutionary game theory

Abstract

To address the urgent need to reduce global carbon emissions and mitigate climate change, China has prioritized the promotion of ultra-low energy consumption green buildings as a key strategy for advancing national carbon neutrality goals. This study explores the critical role of ULEC buildings in supporting these goals by establishing a collaborative framework among the government (GOVT), green real estate developers (GRED), and housebuyers (HBs). Employing a tripartite evolutionary game model informed by current Chinese policies and regulations, this research simulates the dynamic interactions and stable strategies among these stakeholders. Our findings indicate that adjusting land purchase costs and implementing carbon emission fines effectively incentivizes government engagement in cooperative projects, with optimal land valuation identified between 800 and 850 $/m² and carbon emission penalties between 28 and 32 $/t. Subsidies emerge as essential for encouraging active participation from GRED and HBs, yet careful calibration of subsidy levels is recommended to ensure sustainability. This study contributes valuable insights into policy formulation, highlighting actionable strategies to accelerate the development of ultra-low energy consumption green buildings as part of China's path to carbon neutrality.