{"title":"Leadership in a social dilemma: Does it matter if the leader is pro-social or just says they are pro-social?","authors":"Edward Cartwright, Yidan Chai, Lian Xue","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13256","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <p>Previous studies have shown that pro-social leaders cooperate, on average, more than pro-self leaders in social dilemmas. It can, thus, be beneficial for the group to have a pro-social leader. In this paper we analyze the consequences of a leader <i>informing</i> followers that they are pro-social (or pro-self). In doing so, we compare a setting in which the leader's type is truthfully revealed to settings where the leader can ‘hide’ or ‘lie’ about their pro-sociality. We find that a leader saying they are pro-social boosts efficiency, even if the signal is not fully credible. Cooperation is highest in a truth setting with a pro-social leader. We demonstrate that these results are consistent with a belief-based model of social preference in which the stated type of the leader changes the frame of reference for followers.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":"63 1","pages":"160-180"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecin.13256","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Inquiry","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecin.13256","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
Previous studies have shown that pro-social leaders cooperate, on average, more than pro-self leaders in social dilemmas. It can, thus, be beneficial for the group to have a pro-social leader. In this paper we analyze the consequences of a leader informing followers that they are pro-social (or pro-self). In doing so, we compare a setting in which the leader's type is truthfully revealed to settings where the leader can ‘hide’ or ‘lie’ about their pro-sociality. We find that a leader saying they are pro-social boosts efficiency, even if the signal is not fully credible. Cooperation is highest in a truth setting with a pro-social leader. We demonstrate that these results are consistent with a belief-based model of social preference in which the stated type of the leader changes the frame of reference for followers.
期刊介绍：
Published since 1962, (formerly Western Economic Journal), EI is widely regarded as one of the top scholarly journals in its field. Besides containing research on all economics topic areas, a principal objective is to make each article understandable to economists who are not necessarily specialists in the article topic area. Nine Nobel laureates are among EI long list of prestigious authors.
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