The cooperative analysis of oligopoly TU markets with infinitely many firms

IF 4.4 3区管理学 Q1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Annals of Operations Research Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI:10.1007/s10479-024-06392-9

Zhe Yang

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Our paper develops the work of cooperative oligopoly TU markets. Inspired by Zhao (Int J Game Theory 28(1):25–34, 1999) and Zhao (Games Econ Behav 27(1):153–168, 1999), our paper investigates the TU stable profit allocations of cooperative oligopoly TU markets with countably many firms. We first show that the set of \(\alpha -\)TU stable profit allocations coincides with the set of \(\beta -\)TU stable profit allocations. Furthermore, under some regular conditions, we shall prove the existence theorem of \(\alpha -\)TU stable profit allocations for oligopoly TU markets with countably many firms.

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来源期刊

Annals of Operations Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

7.90

自引率

16.70%

发文量

596

审稿时长

8.4 months

期刊介绍： The Annals of Operations Research publishes peer-reviewed original articles dealing with key aspects of operations research, including theory, practice, and computation. The journal publishes full-length research articles, short notes, expositions and surveys, reports on computational studies, and case studies that present new and innovative practical applications. In addition to regular issues, the journal publishes periodic special volumes that focus on defined fields of operations research, ranging from the highly theoretical to the algorithmic and the applied. These volumes have one or more Guest Editors who are responsible for collecting the papers and overseeing the refereeing process.