Doctors taking bribes from pharmaceutical companies is common and not substantially reduced by an educational intervention: a pragmatic randomised controlled trial in Pakistan.
IF 7.1 2区 医学Q1 PUBLIC, ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
Mishal Khan, Muhammad Naveed Noor, Afifah Rahman-Shepherd, Amna Rehana Siddiqui, Sabeen Sharif Khan, Nina van der Mark, Afshan Khurshid Isani, Ahson Q Siddiqi, Charles Opondo, Faisal Ziauddin, Faiza Bhutto, Iqbal Azam, Johanna Hanefeld, Natasha Ali, Robyna Irshad Khan, Syed Ahmed Raza Kazmi, Virginia Wiseman, Wafa Aftab, Zafar Mirza, Zainab Hasan, Sameen Siddiqi, Rumina Hasan, Sadia Shakoor
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Introduction: Incentive-linked prescribing, which is when healthcare providers accept incentives from pharmaceutical companies for prescribing promoted medicines, is a form of bribery that harms patients and health systems globally. We developed a novel method using data collectors posing as pharmaceutical company sales representatives to evaluate private doctors' engagement in incentive-linked prescribing and the impact of a multifaceted educational intervention on reducing this practice in Karachi, Pakistan.
Methods: We made a sampling frame of all doctors running for-profit, primary-care clinics and randomly allocated participants to control and intervention groups (1:1). The intervention group received a multifaceted seminar on ethical prescribing and reinforcement messages over 6 weeks. The control group attended a seminar without mention of ethical prescribing. The primary outcome was the proportion of participants agreeing to accept incentives in exchange for prescribing promoted medicines from data collectors posing as pharmaceutical company representatives, 3 months after the seminars.
Results: We enrolled 419 of 440 eligible participants. Of 210 participants randomly allocated to the intervention group, 135 (64%) attended the intervention seminar and of 209 participants allocated to the control group, 132 (63%) attended the placebo seminar. The primary outcome was assessed in 130 (96%) and 124 (94%) of intervention and control participants, respectively. No participants detected the covert data collectors. 52 control group doctors (41.9%) agreed to accept incentives as compared with 42 intervention group doctors (32.3%). After adjusting for doctors' age, sex and clinic district, there was no evidence of the intervention's impact on the primary outcome (OR 0.70 [95% CI 0.40 to 1.20], p=0.192).
Conclusions: This first study to covertly assess deal-making between doctors and pharmaceutical company representatives demonstrated that the practice is strikingly widespread in the study setting and suggested that substantial reductions are unlikely to be achieved by educational interventions alone. Our novel method provides an opportunity to generate evidence on deal-making between doctors and pharmaceutical companies elsewhere.
导言:与激励挂钩的处方,即卫生保健提供者接受制药公司提供的奖励,开出促销药物,是一种贿赂形式,危害全球患者和卫生系统。我们开发了一种新颖的方法,利用数据收集者冒充制药公司的销售代表来评估私人医生参与与激励相关的处方以及多方面教育干预对减少巴基斯坦卡拉奇这种做法的影响。方法:我们对所有经营营利性初级保健诊所的医生制作了一个抽样框架,并将参与者随机分配到对照组和干预组(1:1)。干预组接受了为期6周的道德处方和强化信息的多方面研讨会。对照组参加了一个没有提及伦理处方的研讨会。主要结果是,在研讨会结束3个月后,同意接受冒充制药公司代表的数据收集者提供的奖励以换取促销药物的参与者比例。结果:440名符合条件的参与者中有419人入组。在随机分配到干预组的210名参与者中,有135名(64%)参加了干预研讨会,在分配到对照组的209名参与者中,有132名(63%)参加了安慰剂研讨会。分别对130名(96%)和124名(94%)干预和对照参与者进行了主要结局评估。没有参与者检测到隐蔽的数据收集器。对照组有52名医生(41.9%)同意接受奖励,干预组有42名医生(32.3%)同意接受奖励。在调整了医生的年龄、性别和诊所地区后,没有证据表明干预对主要结局有影响(OR 0.70 [95% CI 0.40至1.20],p=0.192)。结论:这是第一个秘密评估医生和制药公司代表之间交易的研究,表明这种做法在研究环境中非常普遍,并表明仅通过教育干预不太可能实现大幅减少。我们的新方法为其他地方的医生和制药公司之间的交易提供了证据。
期刊介绍:
BMJ Global Health is an online Open Access journal from BMJ that focuses on publishing high-quality peer-reviewed content pertinent to individuals engaged in global health, including policy makers, funders, researchers, clinicians, and frontline healthcare workers. The journal encompasses all facets of global health, with a special emphasis on submissions addressing underfunded areas such as non-communicable diseases (NCDs). It welcomes research across all study phases and designs, from study protocols to phase I trials to meta-analyses, including small or specialized studies. The journal also encourages opinionated discussions on controversial topics.