Neurosurgery for mental conditions and pain: An historical perspective on the limits of biological determinism.

Abstract

Neurosurgical operations treat involuntary movement disorders (MvDs), spasticity, cranial neuralgias, cancer pain, and other selected disorders, and implantable neurostimulation or drug delivery devices relieve MvDs, epilepsy, cancer pain, and spasticity. In contrast, studies of surgery or device implantations to treat chronic noncancer pain or mental conditions have not shown consistent evidence of efficacy and safety in formal, randomized, controlled trials. The success of particular operations in a finite set of disorders remains at odds with disconfirming results in others. Despite expectations that surgery or device implants would benefit particular patients, the normalization of unproven procedures could jeopardize the perceived legitimacy of functional neurosurgery in general. An unacknowledged challenge in functional neurosurgery is the limitation of biological determinism, wherein network activity is presumed to exclusively or predominantly mediate nociception, affect, and behavior. That notion regards certain pain states and mental conditions as disorders or dysregulation of networks, which, by implication, make them amenable to surgery. Moreover, implantable devices can now detect and analyze neural activity for observation outside the body, described as the extrinsic or micro perspective. This fosters a belief that automated analyses of physiological and imaging data can unburden the treatment of selected mental conditions and pain states from psychological subjectivity and complexity and the inherent sematic ambiguity of self-reporting. That idea is appealing; however, it discounts all other influences. Attempts to sway public opinion and regulators to approve deep brain stimulation for unproven indications could, if successful, harm the public interest, making demands for regulatory approval beside the point.