{"title":"Multiple large shareholders, related-party transactions and accounting conservatism","authors":"Mengmeng Chen, Guoan Ye","doi":"10.1016/j.frl.2024.106714","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using data from A-share listed companies in this study examines the impact of multiple large shareholders on corporate accounting conservatism. Results indicate that as a corporate governance mechanism, multiple large shareholders can exercise oversight over major shareholders and significantly increase corporate accounting conservatism. The mediation effect analysis reveals that multiple large shareholders partially improve accounting conservatism by reducing controlling shareholders’ self-interested behavior. Furthermore, the moderation effect analysis finds that when external oversight mechanisms are weaker, multiple large shareholders play a stronger oversight role in corporate financial behaviors, effectively compensating for the deficiencies of external oversight.","PeriodicalId":12167,"journal":{"name":"Finance Research Letters","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Finance Research Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2024.106714","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Using data from A-share listed companies in this study examines the impact of multiple large shareholders on corporate accounting conservatism. Results indicate that as a corporate governance mechanism, multiple large shareholders can exercise oversight over major shareholders and significantly increase corporate accounting conservatism. The mediation effect analysis reveals that multiple large shareholders partially improve accounting conservatism by reducing controlling shareholders’ self-interested behavior. Furthermore, the moderation effect analysis finds that when external oversight mechanisms are weaker, multiple large shareholders play a stronger oversight role in corporate financial behaviors, effectively compensating for the deficiencies of external oversight.
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