Mohammad Al-Fawa’reh, Jumana Abu-khalaf, Naeem Janjua, Patryk Szewczyk
{"title":"On and off the manifold: Generation and Detection of adversarial attacks in IIoT networks","authors":"Mohammad Al-Fawa’reh, Jumana Abu-khalaf, Naeem Janjua, Patryk Szewczyk","doi":"10.1016/j.jnca.2024.104102","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), which play a crucial role in defending Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) networks, often utilize Deep Neural Networks (DNN) for their pattern recognition capabilities. However, these systems remain susceptible to sophisticated adversarial attacks, particularly on-manifold and off-manifold attacks, which skillfully evade detection. This paper addresses the limitations in existing research, focusing primarily on: the predominant focus on off-manifold attacks, while often overlooking subtler yet potent on-manifold attacks; a lack of consideration for the functional behavior of these attacks; reliance on detailed knowledge of the target NIDS for creating attacks; and the need for detailed knowledge about the creation process of adversarial attacks for effective detection. This paper introduces the Saliency Adversarial Autoencoder (SAAE), designed for generating on-manifold attacks through latent space perturbations. This dual-space perturbation approach enables SAAE to efficiently create stealthy attacks that blend with normal network behavior, posing significant challenges to state-of-the-art (SOTA) NIDS. To counter these advanced threats, we propose an attack-agnostic defence mechanism utilizing a fusion-based Autoencoder (AE) with disentangled representations. This defence is adept at detecting threats within the manifold, significantly enhancing NIDS robustness. Comparative assessments with SOTA DNN and Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) models highlight the effectiveness of our approach. The SAAE model markedly reduces True Positive Rates (TPR) in these systems. For DNNs, TPR dropped from 99.72% to 41.5%, and for DRLs, from 95.6% to 63.94%. Conversely, our defence model shows high TPR in detecting these attacks, registering 94% for DNNs and 92% for DRLs. Additionally, we release our dataset, named OOM-X-IIoTID<ce:cross-ref ref><ce:sup loc=\"post\">1</ce:sup></ce:cross-ref><ce:footnote><ce:label>1</ce:label><ce:note-para view=\"all\">The datasets can be found at the following link: <ce:inter-ref xlink:href=\"https://github.com/mohdah200/OOM-X-IIoTID\" xlink:type=\"simple\">https://github.com/mohdah200/OOM-X-IIoTID</ce:inter-ref>.</ce:note-para></ce:footnote>, which includes On/Off manifold adversarial attacks, a first in the field, to facilitate further research and development in cybersecurity.","PeriodicalId":54784,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Network and Computer Applications","volume":"336 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Network and Computer Applications","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2024.104102","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), which play a crucial role in defending Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) networks, often utilize Deep Neural Networks (DNN) for their pattern recognition capabilities. However, these systems remain susceptible to sophisticated adversarial attacks, particularly on-manifold and off-manifold attacks, which skillfully evade detection. This paper addresses the limitations in existing research, focusing primarily on: the predominant focus on off-manifold attacks, while often overlooking subtler yet potent on-manifold attacks; a lack of consideration for the functional behavior of these attacks; reliance on detailed knowledge of the target NIDS for creating attacks; and the need for detailed knowledge about the creation process of adversarial attacks for effective detection. This paper introduces the Saliency Adversarial Autoencoder (SAAE), designed for generating on-manifold attacks through latent space perturbations. This dual-space perturbation approach enables SAAE to efficiently create stealthy attacks that blend with normal network behavior, posing significant challenges to state-of-the-art (SOTA) NIDS. To counter these advanced threats, we propose an attack-agnostic defence mechanism utilizing a fusion-based Autoencoder (AE) with disentangled representations. This defence is adept at detecting threats within the manifold, significantly enhancing NIDS robustness. Comparative assessments with SOTA DNN and Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) models highlight the effectiveness of our approach. The SAAE model markedly reduces True Positive Rates (TPR) in these systems. For DNNs, TPR dropped from 99.72% to 41.5%, and for DRLs, from 95.6% to 63.94%. Conversely, our defence model shows high TPR in detecting these attacks, registering 94% for DNNs and 92% for DRLs. Additionally, we release our dataset, named OOM-X-IIoTID11The datasets can be found at the following link: https://github.com/mohdah200/OOM-X-IIoTID., which includes On/Off manifold adversarial attacks, a first in the field, to facilitate further research and development in cybersecurity.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Network and Computer Applications welcomes research contributions, surveys, and notes in all areas relating to computer networks and applications thereof. Sample topics include new design techniques, interesting or novel applications, components or standards; computer networks with tools such as WWW; emerging standards for internet protocols; Wireless networks; Mobile Computing; emerging computing models such as cloud computing, grid computing; applications of networked systems for remote collaboration and telemedicine, etc. The journal is abstracted and indexed in Scopus, Engineering Index, Web of Science, Science Citation Index Expanded and INSPEC.