Strategic IPO timing of technology innovation-driven enterprises: A differential game analysis of market returns, disclosure costs, and industry dynamics

Abstract

This article develops a dual-oligopoly differential game model to analyze how technological impacts influence product market competition. This model undertakes a systematic examination of the strategic balancing act enterprises engage in when confronted with technological innovation opportunities, weighing market returns against information disclosure costs in the context of IPO decision-making. The findings reveal that the temporal dimension of technological catch-up and the firms’ intrinsic innovation capabilities are pivotal determinants of IPO timing. Specifically, enterprises that have achieved rapid technological parity and possess robust innovative capacities are more prone to expedite IPOs, seeking to secure funding for further technological advancements and market expansion endeavors. Conversely, elevated information disclosure costs may incentivize companies to postpone IPOs, aiming to shield their technological assets and market strategies from premature competitor scrutiny. Additionally, the study highlights the paradoxical influence of intense market competition: while it incentivizes early IPOs to bolster resource acquisition for competitive strategies, it also exacerbates the detrimental effects of disclosure costs on IPO timing. In conclusion, this investigation not only contributes to the theoretical corpus on IPO decision-making but also offers pragmatic guidance for corporate executives in crafting IPO strategies and serves as a valuable reference for fostering the sustainable development of capital markets.