Beyond thinking fast and slow: a Bayesian intuitionist model of clinical reasoning in real-world practice.

Abstract

Clinical reasoning is a quintessential aspect of medical training and practice, and is a topic that has been studied and written about extensively over the past few decades. However, the predominant conceptualisation of clinical reasoning has insofar been extrapolated from cognitive psychological theories that have been developed in other areas of human decision-making. Till date, the prevailing model of understanding clinical reasoning has remained as the dual process theory which views cognition as a dichotomous two-system construct, where intuitive thinking is fast, efficient, automatic but error-prone, and analytical thinking is slow, effortful, logical, deliberate and likely more accurate. Nonetheless, we find that the dual process model has significant flaws, not only in its fundamental construct validity, but also in its lack of practicality and applicability in naturistic clinical decision-making. Instead, we herein offer an alternative Bayesian-centric, intuitionist approach to clinical reasoning that we believe is more representative of real-world clinical decision-making, and suggest pedagogical and practice-based strategies to optimise and strengthen clinical thinking in this model to improve its accuracy in actual practice.