Assessing the vulnerability of empirical infrastructure networks to natural catastrophes

Abstract

Human-made infrastructures are complex systems continually exposed to events that threat their function, such as cascading failures, occurring when the flow of physical quantities is redistributed within the network as a consequence of localized disruptions. Nevertheless, the role played by exogenous catastrophic events and internal failures on the robustness of critical infrastructures is usually addressed independently, under simplifying assumptions and lacking a unified picture for realistic risk assessments. Here, we fill this gap by introducing the Operational-Affected-Dismantled (OAD) model that captures both local and nonlocal failure propagation mechanisms. The model combines reaction–diffusion processes for local spreading with a global field effect for long-range interactions, allowing us to quantitatively characterize the cascade dynamics in infrastructure networks. Moreover, we include information on external stressors to assess the robustness of empirical network infrastructures and build spatial risk maps. By using data from severe storms (2009–2016) and from earthquakes (2000–2023) as stressors of the North American power grid and the worldwide airline transportation system, respectively, we offer a quantitative way to rank events by their potential to trigger systemic effects. By analyzing the response of the European power grid to simulated severe storms, we find that it can show high levels of systemic risk. Uncertainty in global climate and the accelerating frequency of extreme events all over the globe call for novel strategies to quantify, adapt to and mitigate systemic risk. Our framework provides a suitable starting point to assess the robustness of empirical systems in realistic and what-if scenarios.