Premortalism and the Problem of Involuntary Suffering

Abstract

In a recent article, James Spiegel has suggested ways in which premortalism may bolster the free will defence in response to the logical problem of evil. Building on his presentation, this present article further reinforces the premortalist free will defence whilst also critiquing similarly related defences (such as the necessity of nomic regularity for significant freedom). Contrary to expectation, the premortalist defence is compatible with diverse accounts of divine knowledge (i.e., middle knowledge, dynamic omniscience, etc.) and does not present overly problematic questions of identity if substance dualism is presupposed. More importantly, the premortalist free will defence raises critical questions of consent and agential contractualism that are often overlooked in the literature. Over against a consequentialist framework, the premortalist defence acknowledges the importance of treating the agent as an end in and of herself. Questions of eschatology naturally arise, and contra James Spiegel, this article will propose that universalism, the belief that eventually all will be saved, is nigh undeniable on a premortalist account, given perfect being theism.