LGTDA: Bandwidth exhaustion attack on Ethereum via dust transactions

Abstract

Dust attacks typically involve sending a large number of low-value transactions to numerous addresses, aiming to facilitate transaction tracking and undermine privacy, while simultaneously disrupting the market and increasing transaction delays. These transactions not only impact the network but also incur significant costs. This paper introduces a low-cost attack method called LGTDA, which achieves network partitioning through dust attacks. This method hinders block synchronization by consuming node bandwidth, leading to denial of service (DoS) for nodes and eventually causing large-scale network partitioning. In LGTDA, the attacker does not need to have real control over the nodes in the network, nor is there a requirement for the number of peer connections to the nodes; the attack can even be initiated by simply invoking RPC services to send transactions. Under the condition of ensuring the validity of the attack transactions, the LGTDA attack sends a large volume of low-value, high-frequency dust transactions to the network, relying on nodes for global broadcasting. This sustained attack can significantly impede the growth of block heights among nodes, resulting in network partitioning. We discuss the implications of the LGTDA attack, including its destructive capability, low cost, and ease of execution. Additionally, we analyze the limitations of this attack. Compared to grid lighting attacks, the LGTDA attack has a broader impact range and is not limited by the positional relationship with the victim node. Through experimental validation in a controlled environment, we confirm the effectiveness of this attack.