Truthful multi-unit double auction with transaction costs and sellers’ changing marginal costs

IF 9.8 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL
Jiantao Guo , Juliang Zhang , T.C.E. Cheng
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

It is well-known that lots of sellers offer discounts for large orders because of decreasing marginal costs and large productive capacities. Then some procurement platforms provide ways for small buyers to cooperate with their procurements and get discounts from these sellers. Moreover, these transactions will incur pair-related transaction costs. Generally, buyers values and sellers’ costs are private information. Then a critical problem faced by the platforms is to induce the buyers (sellers) to reveal their values (costs) truthfully and to match the supplies and demands efficiently. To solve this problem, we design a multi-unit double auction mechanism based on the padding method where the buyers bid their values and the sellers submit their marginal costs of different quantities, and the platform selects the winners, allocates the transactions, and sets the transaction prices for both sides. We show that the mechanism is budget-balanced, individually rational, incentive-compatible, and asymptotically efficient. For the special case with zero transaction costs, we further simplify the mechanism and get some new findings. We further conduct numerical studies to compare our mechanism with four commonly used mechanisms to demonstrate its advantages and examine the impacts of some parameters on the performance of our mechanism. Finally, we consider the cases with general marginal cost structure as well as private quantity information, respectively.
有交易成本和卖方边际成本变化的真实多单位双重拍卖
众所周知,由于边际成本下降和生产能力大,很多卖家会为大额订单提供折扣。因此,一些采购平台为小买家提供了合作采购的途径,并从这些卖家那里获得折扣。此外,这些交易会产生与配对相关的交易成本。一般来说,买家的价值和卖家的成本都是私人信息。因此,平台面临的一个关键问题是如何促使买方(卖方)如实披露其价值(成本),并有效地匹配供应和需求。为了解决这个问题,我们设计了一种基于填充法的多单位双重拍卖机制,即买方出价,卖方提交不同数量的边际成本,由平台选择中标者,分配交易,并设定双方的交易价格。我们的研究表明,该机制具有预算平衡、个体理性、激励兼容和渐进高效的特点。对于交易成本为零的特殊情况,我们进一步简化了该机制,并得到了一些新发现。我们进一步进行了数值研究,将我们的机制与四种常用机制进行了比较,以证明其优势,并考察了一些参数对我们机制性能的影响。最后,我们分别考虑了一般边际成本结构和私人数量信息的情况。
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来源期刊
International Journal of Production Economics
International Journal of Production Economics 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
21.40
自引率
7.50%
发文量
266
审稿时长
52 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.
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