{"title":"“I don't care about cookies!” data disclosure and time-inconsistent users","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101112","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Time-inconsistent internet users neglect future privacy costs and release too much data to digital firms. We study how regulation that requires user consent for data processing affects firm profits, user surplus, and welfare, depending on the degree of time inconsistency and on firms' business models. If the firm appropriates sufficiently high profits from data, consent mechanisms increase welfare only if their design facilitates consent refusal and time inconsistency is neither too high nor too low. If firms can make it difficult to opt out, it may be better for society to let the former choose the disclosure level. However, consent policies increase user surplus when time inconsistency is high. Voluntary caps on usage can raise profits by making some users disclose more data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47029,"journal":{"name":"Information Economics and Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Information Economics and Policy","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167624524000349","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Time-inconsistent internet users neglect future privacy costs and release too much data to digital firms. We study how regulation that requires user consent for data processing affects firm profits, user surplus, and welfare, depending on the degree of time inconsistency and on firms' business models. If the firm appropriates sufficiently high profits from data, consent mechanisms increase welfare only if their design facilitates consent refusal and time inconsistency is neither too high nor too low. If firms can make it difficult to opt out, it may be better for society to let the former choose the disclosure level. However, consent policies increase user surplus when time inconsistency is high. Voluntary caps on usage can raise profits by making some users disclose more data.
期刊介绍:
IEP is an international journal that aims to publish peer-reviewed policy-oriented research about the production, distribution and use of information, including these subjects: the economics of the telecommunications, mass media, and other information industries, the economics of innovation and intellectual property, the role of information in economic development, and the role of information and information technology in the functioning of markets. The purpose of the journal is to provide an interdisciplinary and international forum for theoretical and empirical research that addresses the needs of other researchers, government, and professionals who are involved in the policy-making process. IEP publishes research papers, short contributions, and surveys.