How preferences enslave attention: calling into question the endogenous/exogenous dichotomy from an active inference perspective

IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Darius Parvizi-Wayne
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

It is easy to think of attention as a purely sensorimotor, exogenous mechanism divorced from the influence of an agent’s preferences and needs. However, according to the active inference framework, such a strict reduction cannot be straightforwardly invoked, since all cognitive and behavioural processes can at least be described as maximising the evidence for a generative model entailed by the ongoing existence of that agent; that is, the minimisation of variational free energy. As such, active inference models could cast an (embodied) cognitive mechanism like attention, described in this paper as a relevance filter, as constrained (or enslaved) by these prior preferences for which an agent must seek evidence, whether or not such priors are having direct, real-time neurocognitive effects on the sensorimotor loops that couple the attending agent and her surrounding environment. This duality with respect to the role of priors corresponds to a wider, ongoing debate in the active inference community regarding the framework’s explanatory power. More specifically, the debate centres on whether the notion of a generative model and the priors embedded ubiqitously therein act as a purely useful instrumental tool for scientists aiming to model the behaviours of self-organising entities, or, rather, the brain (and body) is genuinely constituted by a predictive hierarchy within which higher-order dynamics constrain and contextualise activity unfolding at lower levels. With a focus on the second (ontologically realist) construal of active inference presented here, this paper argues that in cognitive systems endowed with attentional schema, higher-order preferences do, indeed, impose a demonstrable and powerful modulating effect on the way attention unfolds. Furthermore, these preferences in question transcend the contingent, task-relevant goals that have already been shown to bias attention. Rather, attention is powerfully tuned by the most-deep rooted priors the agent possesses, such that, when sensory evidence against these priors is observed and free energy spikes, the agent attentionally prioritises the homeostatic restoration of these preferred states over their shorter-term desires. This suggests that, at its core, attention is a goal-driven process, which calls into question the putative dichotomy that exists between endogenous (goal-directed) attention and exogenous (stimulus-driven) attention. What emerges in its place is a symbiotic relationship between attention and preferences, whereby the fulfilment of the latter rests on successful application of the former, and the former derives its function from the organismic need to find evidence for the latter.

偏好如何奴役注意力:从主动推理的角度质疑内生/外生二分法
我们很容易将注意力视为一种纯粹的感官运动、外生性机制,与行为主体的偏好和需求无关。然而,根据主动推理框架,这种严格的还原并不能被直接引用,因为所有的认知和行为过程至少都可以被描述为最大化生成模型的证据,该生成模型是由代理的持续存在所决定的;也就是说,最小化变异自由能。因此,主动推理模型可以将注意力这种(具体化的)认知机制(在本文中被描述为相关性过滤器)视为受这些先验偏好的限制(或奴役),而代理必须为这些先验偏好寻找证据,无论这些先验偏好是否对连接出席代理及其周围环境的传感运动环路产生直接、实时的神经认知效应。关于先验作用的这种双重性,与主动推理界关于该框架解释能力的广泛而持续的争论相对应。更具体地说,争论的焦点在于,生成模型的概念及其中无处不在的先验是否纯粹是科学家们用来模拟自组织实体行为的有用工具,或者说,大脑(和身体)是否真正由一个预测性层次结构构成,在这个层次结构中,高阶动态制约着低阶活动的展开,并使之与之相关联。本文以第二种(本体论上的现实主义)对主动推理的解释为重点,论证了在具有注意图式的认知系统中,高阶偏好确实对注意的展开方式产生了明显而强大的调节作用。此外,这些偏好超越了已被证明会对注意力产生偏向的偶然的、与任务相关的目标。相反,注意力受到了行为主体所拥有的最根深蒂固的先验的有力调整,因此,当观察到与这些先验相悖的感官证据并出现自由能峰值时,行为主体的注意力就会优先考虑恢复这些偏好状态,而不是其短期欲望。这表明,注意力的核心是一个目标驱动的过程,这就对存在于内源性(目标导向的)注意力和外源性(刺激驱动的)注意力之间的假定二分法提出了质疑。取而代之的是注意力与偏好之间的共生关系,后者的实现有赖于前者的成功应用,而前者的功能则来自于为后者寻找证据的机体需要。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
8.70%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems.    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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