Xin Huang, Wanrong Li, Chen Cheng, Hao Huang, Guanchun Liu
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
We examine the impact of family firms’ historical ownership on corporate fraud. Our results show that restructured family firms from state-owned enterprises are more likely to violate and commit more fraud than entrepreneurial family firms. This finding is robust to the difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation, an instrument variables regression, fixed effects research design, and propensity score matching (PSM) approach analysis. Mechanism analysis shows that restructured family firms result in lower financial performance, high labor redundancy, inefficient investments, and cash volatility. Therefore, restructured family firms have a stronger incentive to conceal these problems through corporate fraud. Furthermore, the effects of family firms’ historical ownership on corporate fraud are weakened for a more extended period after SOE ownership reform and the restructuring approach adopted by equity takeover.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Business Ethics publishes only original articles from a wide variety of methodological and disciplinary perspectives concerning ethical issues related to business that bring something new or unique to the discourse in their field. Since its initiation in 1980, the editors have encouraged the broadest possible scope. The term `business'' is understood in a wide sense to include all systems involved in the exchange of goods and services, while `ethics'' is circumscribed as all human action aimed at securing a good life. Systems of production, consumption, marketing, advertising, social and economic accounting, labour relations, public relations and organisational behaviour are analysed from a moral viewpoint. The style and level of dialogue involve all who are interested in business ethics - the business community, universities, government agencies and consumer groups. Speculative philosophy as well as reports of empirical research are welcomed. In order to promote a dialogue between the various interested groups as much as possible, papers are presented in a style relatively free of specialist jargon.