Chuqi Zhang, Jun Zeng, Yiming Zhang, Adil Ahmad, Fengwei Zhang, Hai Jin, Zhenkai Liang
{"title":"The HitchHiker's Guide to High-Assurance System Observability Protection with Efficient Permission Switches","authors":"Chuqi Zhang, Jun Zeng, Yiming Zhang, Adil Ahmad, Fengwei Zhang, Hai Jin, Zhenkai Liang","doi":"arxiv-2409.04484","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Protecting system observability records (logs) from compromised OSs has\ngained significant traction in recent times, with several note-worthy\napproaches proposed. Unfortunately, none of the proposed approaches achieve\nhigh performance with tiny log protection delays. They also leverage risky\nenvironments for protection (\\eg many use general-purpose hypervisors or\nTrustZone, which have large TCB and attack surfaces). HitchHiker is an attempt\nto rectify this problem. The system is designed to ensure (a) in-memory\nprotection of batched logs within a short and configurable real-time deadline\nby efficient hardware permission switching, and (b) an end-to-end\nhigh-assurance environment built upon hardware protection primitives with\ndebloating strategies for secure log protection, persistence, and management.\nSecurity evaluations and validations show that HitchHiker reduces log\nprotection delay by 93.3--99.3% compared to the state-of-the-art, while\nreducing TCB by 9.4--26.9X. Performance evaluations show HitchHiker incurs a\ngeometric mean of less than 6% overhead on diverse real-world programs,\nimproving on the state-of-the-art approach by 61.9--77.5%.","PeriodicalId":501333,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Operating Systems","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Operating Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.04484","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Protecting system observability records (logs) from compromised OSs has
gained significant traction in recent times, with several note-worthy
approaches proposed. Unfortunately, none of the proposed approaches achieve
high performance with tiny log protection delays. They also leverage risky
environments for protection (\eg many use general-purpose hypervisors or
TrustZone, which have large TCB and attack surfaces). HitchHiker is an attempt
to rectify this problem. The system is designed to ensure (a) in-memory
protection of batched logs within a short and configurable real-time deadline
by efficient hardware permission switching, and (b) an end-to-end
high-assurance environment built upon hardware protection primitives with
debloating strategies for secure log protection, persistence, and management.
Security evaluations and validations show that HitchHiker reduces log
protection delay by 93.3--99.3% compared to the state-of-the-art, while
reducing TCB by 9.4--26.9X. Performance evaluations show HitchHiker incurs a
geometric mean of less than 6% overhead on diverse real-world programs,
improving on the state-of-the-art approach by 61.9--77.5%.