Detection-based resilient control for cyber-physical systems against two-channel false data injection attacks

Abstract

This paper focuses on a detection-based resilient control issue for cyber-physical systems (CPSs) subject to false data injection (FDI) attacks, where FDI attacks occur in the communication channels from the sensor-to-controller and controller-to-actuator. Firstly, to reduce the adverse impacts of FDI attacks on estimation performance, an unbiased estimator is constructed by tackling the equality-constrained optimization problem. Then, an effective attack detection mechanism is devised by introducing a pseudo-innovation sequence to formulate the detection function, which can successfully detect two-channel FDI attacks. Based on these detection results, a resilient controller combining linear quadratic Gaussian and $H_{\infty }$ controllers is provided to guarantee the mean-square asymptotic stability of CPSs with $H_{\infty }$ performance. Finally, the validity of the proposed resilient control approach is demonstrated by a simulation involving satellite control system.