{"title":"Being with Others and the Practice of Theodicy","authors":"Stuart Jesson","doi":"10.1177/09539468241283237","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this article I aim to highlight one aspect of what it is like to address the problem of evil. The discussion aims to show that the suffering of others comes to matter, in part, because of the way in which we are with others, and they with us. Through a sustained discussion of the film 12 Years a Slave, and drawing on the idea of joint attention, I suggest that the possibility of sharing attitudes with others is central to our experience of the meaning of suffering. In dialogue with the moral philosophy of Stephen Darwall, I highlight the way in which—at least in some significant cases—being with others depends on mutual answerability. These points suggest that whilst moral critics of theodicy are right to emphasise the way that the practice of theodicy can involve a failure to recognise the seriousness of suffering, it is a mistake to think that the suffering of others is ‘hermeneutically off-limits’ to me: whilst we may often be concerned for others, we can also be concerned with them. This, it is claimed, is an intrinsic part of the difficulty of the problem of evil, as well as one reason for its moral significance.","PeriodicalId":43593,"journal":{"name":"Studies in Christian Ethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studies in Christian Ethics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09539468241283237","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"RELIGION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this article I aim to highlight one aspect of what it is like to address the problem of evil. The discussion aims to show that the suffering of others comes to matter, in part, because of the way in which we are with others, and they with us. Through a sustained discussion of the film 12 Years a Slave, and drawing on the idea of joint attention, I suggest that the possibility of sharing attitudes with others is central to our experience of the meaning of suffering. In dialogue with the moral philosophy of Stephen Darwall, I highlight the way in which—at least in some significant cases—being with others depends on mutual answerability. These points suggest that whilst moral critics of theodicy are right to emphasise the way that the practice of theodicy can involve a failure to recognise the seriousness of suffering, it is a mistake to think that the suffering of others is ‘hermeneutically off-limits’ to me: whilst we may often be concerned for others, we can also be concerned with them. This, it is claimed, is an intrinsic part of the difficulty of the problem of evil, as well as one reason for its moral significance.
在这篇文章中,我旨在强调解决邪恶问题的一个方面。讨论旨在表明,他人的痛苦之所以重要,部分原因在于我们与他人相处的方式,以及他人与我们相处的方式。通过对电影《为奴十二年》(12 Years a Slave)的持续讨论,并借鉴 "共同关注"(joint attention)的理念,我认为与他人分享态度的可能性是我们体验苦难意义的核心。通过与斯蒂芬-达尔沃尔(Stephen Darwall)的道德哲学对话,我强调了--至少在某些重要情况下--与他人共处取决于相互承担责任的方式。这些观点表明,尽管对神智论的道德批评者强调神智论的实践可能涉及不承认苦难的严重性的方式是正确的,但认为他人的苦难对我而言是 "诠释学上的禁区 "则是错误的:尽管我们可能经常关注他人,但我们也可以关注他们。据称,这正是邪恶问题的内在困难所在,也是其道德意义的原因之一。