{"title":"“Public goods, labor supply and benefit taxation”","authors":"Cristian F. Sepulveda","doi":"10.1007/s10797-024-09865-6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>A benefit tax is a tax whose amount is determined in accordance with the benefits received. It is well-known that an increase in the tax burden reduces individual welfare due to its negative effect on private consumption, but the public finance literature commonly disregards the positive effects that an increase in public goods provision (that follow the increase in taxes) can have on taxpayers’ welfare. This paper first considers an economy in which a proportional labor-income tax is used to finance the provision of (pure) public goods, and describes a “second-best benefit” tax solution to the tax-expenditure problem that is efficient and satisfies the benefit principle of taxation. The analogous “first-best benefit” tax solution can be obtained with the same procedure under lump-sum taxation. The tax burdens under these solutions are set individually to maximize each taxpayer’s surplus given the contributions of all taxpayers and no free riding. The solutions provide natural benchmarks to separate the problems of efficiency and redistribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":47518,"journal":{"name":"International Tax and Public Finance","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Tax and Public Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-024-09865-6","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
A benefit tax is a tax whose amount is determined in accordance with the benefits received. It is well-known that an increase in the tax burden reduces individual welfare due to its negative effect on private consumption, but the public finance literature commonly disregards the positive effects that an increase in public goods provision (that follow the increase in taxes) can have on taxpayers’ welfare. This paper first considers an economy in which a proportional labor-income tax is used to finance the provision of (pure) public goods, and describes a “second-best benefit” tax solution to the tax-expenditure problem that is efficient and satisfies the benefit principle of taxation. The analogous “first-best benefit” tax solution can be obtained with the same procedure under lump-sum taxation. The tax burdens under these solutions are set individually to maximize each taxpayer’s surplus given the contributions of all taxpayers and no free riding. The solutions provide natural benchmarks to separate the problems of efficiency and redistribution.
期刊介绍:
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE publishes outstanding original research, both theoretical and empirical, in all areas of public economics. While the journal has a historical strength in open economy, international, and interjurisdictional issues, we actively encourage high-quality submissions from the breadth of public economics.The special Policy Watch section is designed to facilitate communication between the academic and public policy spheres. This section includes timely, policy-oriented discussions. The goal is to provide a two-way forum in which academic researchers gain insight into current policy priorities and policy-makers can access academic advances in a practical way. INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE is peer reviewed and published in one volume per year, consisting of six issues, one of which contains papers presented at the annual congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (refereed in the usual way). Officially cited as: Int Tax Public Finance