The effect of corporate governance on financial fragility in non-financial companies: a Minskyian approach

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on financial fragility in non-financial corporations, using Nishi’s operationalization of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. Specifically, the study investigates the influence of board size, board independence, CEO duality and audit quality on the financial fragility of non-financial companies (NFCs).

Design/methodology/approach

Using a panel logit regression model, the authors analyse annual data from (66) NFCs listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, spanning over the period 2015–2021. This methodology enables us to assess the relationships between the identified CG mechanisms and the categorical proxy of financial fragility.

Findings

The findings of this study reveal that a large share of NFCs fall within Minsky’s “Ponzi” classification, indicating elevated levels of financial vulnerability. Remarkably, the analysis demonstrates that larger board sizes and the CEO-Chairman duality exacerbate financial fragility within these firms. Conversely, the study results suggest that board independence and audit quality exhibit limited effects on financial fragility. In addition, profitability, firm size and financial leverage are identified as key predictors of financial fragility.

Originality/value

This study adds to the current literature by using a financial fragility index grounded in Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. The constructed index is then used to examine specific CG factors in relation to financial fragility, which offers new insights into the dynamics influencing the default exposure of NFCs. Furthermore, the study findings have direct implications for policymakers and stakeholders aiming to enhance CG practices and foster financial stability in the private sector.