{"title":"Sanctioning environmental offenses committed by companies: the joint use of firm and employee sanctions","authors":"Dietrich Earnhart, Sandra Rousseau","doi":"10.1007/s10657-024-09806-y","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Violations of environmental regulations often involve multiple parties since companies, as well as employees of the companies, face regulatory obligations and can expend compliance-enhancing effort. When deterring such violations by punishing violators, court judges must determine which party or parties to punish with sanctions. Our study explores such sanction decisions made by Belgian judges in response to environmental offenses and the defendants’ intent to comply as captured by three key Belgian legal elements reflecting culpability: purpose, willingness, and knowledge. Our empirical results reveal that the three culpability factors play strong roles in shaping judges’ sanction decisions, especially the relative use of firm sanctions and employee sanctions. As important, our empirical results strongly demonstrate that judges appear to perceive firm and employee sanctions as complements.</p>","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"402 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-024-09806-y","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Violations of environmental regulations often involve multiple parties since companies, as well as employees of the companies, face regulatory obligations and can expend compliance-enhancing effort. When deterring such violations by punishing violators, court judges must determine which party or parties to punish with sanctions. Our study explores such sanction decisions made by Belgian judges in response to environmental offenses and the defendants’ intent to comply as captured by three key Belgian legal elements reflecting culpability: purpose, willingness, and knowledge. Our empirical results reveal that the three culpability factors play strong roles in shaping judges’ sanction decisions, especially the relative use of firm sanctions and employee sanctions. As important, our empirical results strongly demonstrate that judges appear to perceive firm and employee sanctions as complements.
期刊介绍:
The European Journal of Law and Economics provides readers with high-quality theoretical and empirical research in which both the legal and economic dimensions merge and combine. The journal welcomes articles that promote a better understanding of legal phenomena, legal decisions made by judges, courts or regulatory agencies, and involving economic tools. Theoretical papers are welcome, provided they have a strong basis in law and economics. We also welcome case studies, as well as empirical analyses – including empirical legal studies – and experimental investigations. The European Journal of Law and Economics does not favor any particular topic, but does have a focus on new and emerging problems. European themes are particularly welcome, because we feel it is important to exploit Europe’s considerable institutional diversity in order to build a more robust body of theory and empirical evidence. However, the purpose of the journal is also to showcase the diversity of law and economics approaches, as supplied by an international mix of authors. Drawing on the support of respected scholars from around the world, who serve as consulting editors and editorial board members, the Editors wish to give contributing authors the opportunity to improve their papers, while also offering them a quick and efficient review process.
Officially cited as: Eur J Law Econ