{"title":"Infinity, Choice, and Hume’s Principle","authors":"Stephen Mackereth","doi":"10.1007/s10992-024-09771-6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>It has long been known that in the context of axiomatic second-order logic (SOL), Hume’s Principle (HP) is mutually interpretable with “the universe is Dedekind infinite” (DI). In this paper, we offer a more fine-grained analysis of the logical strength of HP, measured by deductive implications rather than interpretability. Our main result is that HP is not deductively conservative over SOL + DI. That is, SOL + HP proves additional theorems in the language of pure second-order logic that are not provable from SOL + DI alone. Arguably, then, HP is not just a pure axiom of infinity, but rather it carries additional logical content. On the other hand, we show that HP is <span>\\(\\Pi ^1_1\\)</span> conservative over SOL + DI, and that HP is conservative over SOL + DI + “the universe is well ordered” (WO). Next, we show that SOL + HP does not prove any of the simplest and most natural versions of the axiom of choice, including WO and weaker principles. Lastly, we discuss other axioms of infinity. We show that HP does not prove the Splitting or Pairing principles (axioms of infinity stronger than DI).</p>","PeriodicalId":51526,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-024-09771-6","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
It has long been known that in the context of axiomatic second-order logic (SOL), Hume’s Principle (HP) is mutually interpretable with “the universe is Dedekind infinite” (DI). In this paper, we offer a more fine-grained analysis of the logical strength of HP, measured by deductive implications rather than interpretability. Our main result is that HP is not deductively conservative over SOL + DI. That is, SOL + HP proves additional theorems in the language of pure second-order logic that are not provable from SOL + DI alone. Arguably, then, HP is not just a pure axiom of infinity, but rather it carries additional logical content. On the other hand, we show that HP is \(\Pi ^1_1\) conservative over SOL + DI, and that HP is conservative over SOL + DI + “the universe is well ordered” (WO). Next, we show that SOL + HP does not prove any of the simplest and most natural versions of the axiom of choice, including WO and weaker principles. Lastly, we discuss other axioms of infinity. We show that HP does not prove the Splitting or Pairing principles (axioms of infinity stronger than DI).
众所周知,在公理二阶逻辑(SOL)中,休谟原理(HP)与 "宇宙是戴德金无限的"(DI)是可以相互解释的。在本文中,我们以演绎意义而非可解释性来衡量,对休谟原理的逻辑强度进行了更精细的分析。我们的主要结果是,与 SOL + DI 相比,HP 在演绎上并不保守。也就是说,SOL + HP 在纯二阶逻辑语言中证明了更多的定理,而这些定理是 SOL + DI 无法单独证明的。因此,可以说,HP 不仅仅是一个纯粹的无穷公理,而是包含了额外的逻辑内容。另一方面,我们证明HP在SOL + DI上是保守的,HP在SOL + DI +"宇宙是有序的"(WO)上也是保守的。接下来,我们证明 SOL + HP 不能证明选择公理的任何最简单和最自然的版本,包括 WO 和弱化原则。最后,我们讨论其他无穷公理。我们证明了 HP 无法证明拆分原则或配对原则(比 DI 更强的无穷公理)。
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Philosophical Logic aims to provide a forum for work at the crossroads of philosophy and logic, old and new, with contributions ranging from conceptual to technical. Accordingly, the Journal invites papers in all of the traditional areas of philosophical logic, including but not limited to: various versions of modal, temporal, epistemic, and deontic logic; constructive logics; relevance and other sub-classical logics; many-valued logics; logics of conditionals; quantum logic; decision theory, inductive logic, logics of belief change, and formal epistemology; defeasible and nonmonotonic logics; formal philosophy of language; vagueness; and theories of truth and validity. In addition to publishing papers on philosophical logic in this familiar sense of the term, the Journal also invites papers on extensions of logic to new areas of application, and on the philosophical issues to which these give rise. The Journal places a special emphasis on the applications of philosophical logic in other disciplines, not only in mathematics and the natural sciences but also, for example, in computer science, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, linguistics, jurisprudence, and the social sciences, such as economics, sociology, and political science.